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INTRODUCTION  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  OF  THE  GROUP  AND  PROBLEMS 
OF  ADJUSTMENT  POLICIES 
1.  Terms  of  reference 
The  performance  of  the  European  economies  in the 1970s  were  marked 
by  slower  growth  and  higher  unemployment.  This  situation  was 
closely connected  with  the onset of  the  energy  problem  and  faster 
inflation.  The  effectiveness  of  macroeconomic  demand  management 
·instruments as  deployed  in  the 1950s  and  1960s  was  increasingly 
called  into question,  and  intervention at  microeconomic  Level  be-
came  more  widespread. 
(1)  Two  reports  were  produced  for  the  Commission  by  a  group  of 
experts  chaired by  Mr.  Maldague.  Both  tried to describe the  changes 
in  the  sectoral  performance  of  the  European  economies  and  the 
types  of structural  adjustment· carried out  in  the different  member 
countries.  Both  ended  with  an  expression  of  concern  regarding the 
adjustment  capacity of member  countries'  economies,  characterized 
by  growing  divergence  in their industrial structures. 
7~ ~  ~6'  The  purpose  of  these  studies  was  not  to make  a  systematic  compari-
rti..~ ~  son  of  adjustmen.ts  in  sectoral structures and  the  macroeconomic 
~  ~  ~  ~  and  specific  policies  underlying  them.  Nonetheless,  one  important 
c-U.d.C:.6 •••  provisional - col!clusion  could  be  drawn  from  the  studies,  namely 
that macroeconomic  performances  and  policies  influence  the direction 
and  pace  of  structural  adjustment.  Even  so,  it was  necessary to 
take  the  analysis  further.  Thus,  despite  the  technical  complexity 
of  the  relationships  between  policies and  adjustment,  the  Commission 
(1)  "Sectoral  change  in  the  European  economies  from  1960  to  the 
recession",  II/253/4/76,  Brussels,  January 1978;  and 
"Changes  in  industrial structure  in  the  European  economies 
since  the oil crisis, 1973-1978",  European  Economy,  Special 
Issue,  Brussels 1979. ••• ~  t&e  ~ed  felt  that  an  initial analysis  of  the  instruments  and  policies  de~ 
~  ~  ~6i6  ~ played  should  be  made,  and  this  in  an  attempt  to produce  an  assess-
6~  ~- ment  of  experience  gained  and  ideas  expressed  in each  of  the 
~.  Member  States  and  at  Community  level  in  this  connection. 
The  Commission  accordingly  requested a  group  of  four  experts 
chaired by  Mr.  Maldague  to make  an  initial assessment  of  inter-
vention;  this  report  looks  into a  number  of  matters  which  merit 
further  analysis  from  a  Community  viewpoint,  in  view  of their  im-
portance for  the  cohesion  of  the  Community  over  the next  few  years. 
2.  The  problems  of  adjustment  policies 
In  general,  structural adjustment  of the  economy  is a  continuous, 
complex  process  resulting  from  changes  in  producers'  and  consumers' 
behaviour  in order  to  adapt  to  new  market  conditions,  the outcome 
•••  ~ ~~  ~ ~  of  which  is economic  growth  itself.  In  the  last  few  years,  how-
and ~~66  ever,  the  concept  of  adjustment  has  become  central  to the  economic 
~all  ~6,...  policy debate  because  a  set of  relatively uncontrollable  factors 
have  demanded  greater adaptability from  economic  agents  while 
growing  constraints  on  adjustment  have  emerged  elsewhere. 
It is  customary  nowadays  to  calL  adjustment  measures  "positive" 
when  their aim  is to  make  the  productive  system  more  flexible  and 
more  capable  of  adapting  to  change, as opposed  to  "negative" adjust-
ment  measures  which  maintain  the  "status  quo",  preserve  ineffi-
cient  structures or  introduce  additional  distortions  and  rigidities 
into  the operation of  the  economy  and  into trade. 
2 2 .1 •  A number  of easily identifiable factors  explain  a  "growing 
demand"  for  adjustment.  These  are: 
the  energy  constraint  requiring  the  development  of  alter-
native  sources  and  a  reduction  of  energy  consumption; 
the  changes  in  the  international division of  labour,  and 
in  particular the  emergence  of  the  newly  industrializing 
countries, 
the  faster  pace  of  technical  progress  and  a  higher  rate of 
(1)  obsolescence of  products,  processes  and  production  systems. 
The  influence of  these  factors  is not  new:  changes  in the  relative 
prices of  energy  sources  have  been  taking place  throughout  the  post-
war  period,  the  international division of  Labour  has  been  changing 
all the  time  and  technical  progress  has  been  a  constant  source of 
economic  growth. 
The  new  element  which  will  alter the  scale  of  adjustment  problems 
in  the  years  ahead  lies  in  the  combination  of  these  three  factors 
and  in  the  special  importance  which  each  of  them  has  recently ac-
quired.  (This  Last  point  is particularly apparent  in  the  turn-
around- from  a  decline to  a  continuous  rise- in  the  trend of oil 
prices after the  first  energy  crisis.) 
Other  factors  which  also  contribute  to  reinforcing the  "need"  for 
adjustment  are more  ambiguous  because  they  can  in  turn be  analysed 
in  terms  of  the objectives of, -or  the  constraints  hampering,  the 
adjustment  process. 
(1)  For  example,  technological  changes  in  telecommunications  have 
been  as  follows:  step-by-step process  <1891),  Crossbar  (1950>, 
stored  program  control  (1968);  analogic  electronic  (1977) 
(See  Ira  C.  Magaziner  :  The  rationale and  the competitive eco-
nomics  of  public  policy  for  new  industries'',  Symposium  on  in-
dustrial  policies  for  the 80 1s, Madrid,  5-9  May  1980). Thi•  is particularly the  case  for  employment.  It  is true  that 
the  growth  potential of  the  European  economies  will  be  largely 
determined  by  their ability to ease  the  energy  constraint,  to 
safeguard their overall  competitiveness,  and  to  incorporate  the 
"available" technical  pr~gress.  But,  in  many  cases,  the  adjust-
ments  needed  to  provide  a  lasting base  for  growth  and  employment. 
in  the  next  few  years  pose  a  short-term threat  to  a  considerable 
number  of  existing  jobs,  and  this at  a  time  when,  as  a  result of 
slack  growth  in  recent  years  and  demographic  trends,  unemployment 
has  risen  to  unprecedented  levels.  This  conflict  between  the 
immediate  cost  of  adjustment  policies  (higher  unemployment)  and 
the  medium-term  benefit  (higher  event~al  level  of  new  viable  jobs) 
severely tests  the ability of  governments  to  reconcile the  need 
for  an  immediate  social  consensus  and  longer-run· economic  require-
ments • 
•• ;~.£.<! ~  2.2.  New  constraints  are at  present  hindering  the  normal  adjust-
~  ~UUt  GU,H.d~.s.  ment  process: 
(i)  the  persistence of  high  rates  of  inflation  and  the  greater 
variability of  relative prices  increase  the uncertainty 
facing  potential oil  investors  and  encourage  the  adoption 
of nationalization projects or  investment  projects  provi-
ding  an  immediate  return,  a  pattern which  is not  always 
in  Line  with  the  restructuring  requirements· of  the economy; 
Cii)  greater unpredictability of  government  action  at  micro-
economic  and  macroeconomic  level  and,  in general,  increased 
slowness  in  the  public  decision-making process,·due  in 
part  to  the  need  for  consul~ation; 
(iii)  persistently slow-growth  which  (with  fairly  abrupt  changes 
since  1974)  make  adjustments  particularly difficult  to 
achieve  because  of  the  insufficient  number  of  new  jobs 
created and  which  is  Liable  to  diminish  resistance to de-
fensive  measures; 
4 (iv)  a  series of  rigidities that  are  partly institutional and 
relate  in  particular  to  the  Labour  factor  are,  in  a  con-
text  of  slower  growth,  holding  back  the  adaptation.of 
production  structures to  changes  in comparative  advantage. 
Two  other  factors  merit  special  attention. 
First, the  room  for  manoeuvre  at  present afforded  by  public  finance 
has  been  considerably  reduced  by.the  sluggish  economic  growth  in 
recent  years.  It  is  sufficie~t to recall in this  resbect  the 
often  very  large deficits  and  the  structure of  expenditure,  in 
which  intervention  measures  devoted  to  conservation  have  accounted 
for  an  appreciably greater proportion.  The  reduced  flexibility 
of  public  finance  has  Largely  deprived  the  economies  of a  potential 
adjustment  instrument. 
Second,  the  Level  of  investment  since 1973  has  been  insufficient 
to permit  structural adaptations  on  a  scale  similar to  those 
carried out  previously.  This  has  both  aggravated  the  employment 
constraint  and  slowed  down  the  incorporation of  technical  progress 
into  the  production  process. 
Because  of  the  difficulty of  promoting  investment  through  macro-
econo~ic  measu~es, for  reasons  connected  with  both  external  and 
internal equilibria  (energy  constraints adversely affecting the 
trade  balance,  the  danger  of  a  renewed  burst of  inflation>,  more 
specific  intervention  measures  become  more  widespread. 
S-t.a.t-e. ~  2.3.  Put  very  simply,  State  intervention  in  the economy  is 
usually  justified by  the  need  to  remedy  shortcomings  in  mechanisms 
<external  economies  and  diseconomies  arising out  of  the activity 
of  economic  agents,  monopolistic  or  o~igopolistic practices)  and 
by  the  desire  to allocate  resources  fairly. 
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In  a  context  where  conflicts over  resource distribution at  national 
and  international  level  go  some  way  towards  explaining  the  slow-
down  in  growth  and  the  ineffectiveness of  the  tools of  macro~ 
economic  management,  supply policies,  that  is  to say policies 
which  act  on  production  capacity in  the  medium  and  in the  long 
term,  have  been  increasingly  recognized  as  likely to achieve  better 
results.  Attention therefore  has  focussed  on  the  conditions  for 
financing  capital accumulation,  the skills and  availability of 
manpower,  the  rate  at  which  innovation  is applied to  technology, 
the  conditions  determining  both  national  and  international  compe-
tition, and  the  impact  of  State  intervention on  Long-term  growth 
factors. 
The  Group's  views  on  State  intervention  in  the  adjustment  process 
were  concerned  primarily with  industry,  but  some  of  its conclusions, 
deriving  from  its assessment  of  the ability of  instruments  and 
policies to  contribute to positive adjustment,  could apply  to  eco-
nomic  activity as  a  whole.  Of  the  Member  States  only Germany, 
France,  Italy and  the  United  Kingdom  have  been  studied  in detail. 
Even  so,  the  countries examined  form  a  fairly  representative  sample 
of  European  economies  and,  as  a·  result,  the  report's  conclusions, 
while  formulated  in  general  terms,  can  be  thought  to have  wider 
relevance. (1) 
3.  Structure  of  the  report 
Following  this brief account  of the  present  background  to  the  pro~ 
blem  of adjustment, the  report  summarizes  the  result~ of previous 
work  on the trend of sectoral structures <Chapter  I). It  goes on to 
examine the  role of  the State  in  member  countries' economies from 
the point of view  of its structural  impact,  discussing  in turn over-
all  economic  management  measures,  horizontal  measures,  government 
(1)  Nonetheless,  where  some  important  aspects  are  concerned,  each 
country's experience  is  sui  generis. involvement  in  the  economy,  the  role of  taxation  and  the  role of 
public  enterprises  (Chapter  II).  Direct  structural  intervention 
by  Member  States  is then  analysed  in  Chapter  III, both  by  country 
and  by  type  of  instrument  according  to  the  aim  pursued  (measures 
operating on  the  inputs of  firms,  on  technology  and  organization 
methods  or  on  markets).  Chapter  IV,  which  discusses  the  role of 
the  Community,  is followed  by  the  report's  conclusions. 
It should  be  pointed  out  at  this stage  that  relevant  information, 
especially harmonized,  is not  always  readily available;  for  this 
reason,  the  arguments  and  the  illustrations  in  the  report  are 
often  incomplete. 
7 CHAPTER  I  ADAPTATION  OF  ECONOMIC  STRUCTURES  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
1.1.  As  the  1980s  get  under  way,  div'ergence  in  inflation and  un-
employment  rates still exist  as  between  Member  States:  aggregates 
such  as output,  private  consumption  and  per  capita  investment  (at 
current  prices  and  at  purchasing  power  parities)  and  also  the 
indicators of  regional  disparities  show  that  the situation  has  not 
changed  much  over  the  Last  ten years. 
Divergences  in structural adaptation  are  also still quite  pronounced 
in  industry.  The  1960s  witnessed  rapid  growth  in  the  same  branches 
of  industry  in virtually all Member  States  (chemicals  and  chemical 
derivatives, electrical  and  electronic  equipment,  the motor  vehicle 
industry and  energy)  and  a  relative decline  in  coal  mining,  tex-
tiles,  leather and  clothing;  this  resulted,  at  least  at  a  fairly 
high  level  of aggregation,  in  some  alignment  of  production. struc-
tures.  Despite  this  convergence  of  sectoral  developments,  diffe-
••• ~~~  ~~  rences  in  adaptability persisted  and  even  widened  significantly 
~  ~~~~ 0  during  the  period  of  slow  growth  which  followed  the  energy crisis  • 
. B~~ ~~  1.2.  In  Germany,  a  country  which  specializes  in  the export  of 
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high-technology products,  there  was  some  market  penetration by 
imports  with  a  Low  value-added  content.  While  costs  were  held 
down  (between  1973  and  1979,  prices  rose  at  an  annual  rate of  4.6%, 
as  against  10.4%  for  the  Community  as  a  whole),  industrial  pro-
ductivity  climbed  at  a  rate  which,  though  lower  than  in  the  1960s, 
was  higher  than  the  Community  average  (3.6%  between  1973  and  1979, 
as  against  3.2%  for  the  Community).  However,  net  job  losses  (to 
some  extent  at  the  expense  of  immigrant  workers)  amounted  to 1.5 
mill ion  during  the  same  period. ~~~66 
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The  upturn  in  investment  from  1976  onwards  and  the decline  in  the 
rate of  unemployment  were  the  result of  an  unremitting effort of 
adaptation  which  strengthened the entire productive  structure 
(the textile  industry  in  fact  has  the  highest  productivity rate 
in  the  Community),  although  the  general  slowdown  in  productivity 
gains  may  give  rise to  problems  in  the  long  run,  as  it may  in 
other  industrialized countries. 
1.3.  The  United  Kingdom's  share of  world  exports  contracted up 
to  1973  and  subsequently  Levelled out, owing  to the  depre~ation 
of  the  pound,  the  country's  relatively favourable  pattern of export 
specialization and  the decline  in  domestic  demand. 
Since  1979,  several  factors,  including  the  strengthening of  the 
pound  (due  to  North  Sea  oil and  a  stringent monetary  policy>,  a 
very  high  rate of  inflation and  a  very'low  rate of  investment  in 
manufacturing,  have  reduced  the  country's  market  share,  especially 
at  home.  Net  trade  in manufactured  goods  (exports  - imports>  as 
a  percentage  of  manufactured  exports declined  from  53%  in 1963  to 
13.5%  in 1978  and  to  5%  in 1979.  As  the  United  Kingdom  economy 
is  highly dependent  on  foreign  trade  (the  proportion of  output 
exported  is greater  than  in  Germany),  the  above  trend makes  the 
economy  very vulnerable.  The  relative decline of  industry  in  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  transfer of  value-added  creation to the 
services  sector  is  continuing,  except  in  chemicals  and  in one 
part  of  the electronics industry, which are still relatively profit-
able.  The  share of  manufacturing  in  value-added  (28.3%  in  1979) 
is  Lower  than  in  most  other  European  economies,  whereas  it was 
the  second  highest  in  1970. 
Following  the  relative decline  in  real  wages,  which  has  to  some 
extent offset  the  advantages of  a  switch  to  more  capital-intensive 
products,  processes  and  indus~ries, the  decline  in  the  share  of 
Low-productivity activities has  slowed  down  and  the fall  in  real. in-
comes  has  continued. 
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1.4.  In  terms  of  export  performance,  Italy appears  to  have  profited 
more  from  the  effects of  the depreciation of  the  Lira.  ·Serious 
structural  weaknesses  still persist:  a  growth  of  investment  which, 
despite  the  upturn  in  1979  and  1980,  has  been  much  slower  than  the 
Community  average  in  the  period 1970-79  (0.6%  as  against  2.1%>; 
a  Level  of sectoral productivity  Lower  than  in other Member  States; 
a  very  heavy  dependence  on  imported  energy,  and  an  industrial 
specialization  which  makes  the  Italian economy  potentially more 
vulnerable  to  competition  from  Low-wage  countries •.  Despite  the 
fairly  Large  number  of  new  jobs  created,  notably  in 1979  and  1980, 
unemployment  has  remained  high  owing  to  the  growth.of  the  Labour 
force  and  the  decline  in  out-migration.  A major  adjustment  effort 
is needed  as  a  result  of  the  dual  nature of  the  industrial sector, 
divided  as  it is  between  Large  firms  (some  of  which  are  partly 
State-owned,  heavily  in  debt  and  concentrated  in  crisis-ridden 
sectors)  and  small  firms  (which  are  very dynamic  but  have  limited 
technological  and  research  potential). 
I.S.  The  productive  apparatus  in  France  was  less  affected  by  the 
1974/75  crisis  than  that  in  the  other  member  countries  (the over-
all  rate of  growth  in  value  added  by  .industry actually  remained. 
positive  during  this  period)  but, in spite of a  healthy export  per-
formance,,  it  seems  to  have  Lost  a  good  deal  of  the  dynamism  which 
previously marked  the  adaptation of its economic  structures. 
Admittedly,  some  industries  (intermediate products,  motor  vehicle 
construction,  paper,  plastics, etc.)  are  now  back  on  a  growth 
rate  much  the  same  as  that  observed  in  the  1960s  and  in  the early 
1970s,  but  the  services  sector  is  the  only sector  in  which  this 
has  been  accompanied  by  a  sustained  rise  in  investment. 
And  yet,  French  industry  has,  albeit  at  a  Later  stage than  its 
major  European  competitors,  embarked  on  a  decisive  Labour-shedding 
process  affecting  almost  all  branches:  this  was  the  price to  be 
paid for  maintaining  a  productivity trend  compatible  with  its 
10 -U.w.e.d~ i-d 
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involvement  in  the  system  of  international trade  and  with  the 
franc's  membership  of  the  EMS.  Nevertheless,  despite  the  pursuit 
of  export  growth  (over  what  may  be  an  unduly  limited  range  of 
products>,  which  is one  of  the  key  factors  underpinning expansion, 
industry's  dependence  on  imports  continues  to  hamper  any  desirable 
acceleration  in  gro~th. 
1.6.  Belgium's  very  high  degree  of  economic  integration at  the 
European  level  has  reduced  its capacity  for  responding  to  the 
crisis  in  an  independent  manner. 
Its  industrial output  is,  for  the  most  part,  generated  in  sectors 
such  as  steel, glass, textiles, equipment  goods  and  chemicals 
which  between  1965  and  1975  increasingly became  "transit  channels" 
cut  off  from  the  country's  interlocking  industrial fabric,  that  is 
to  say  dependent  on  the outside  world  for  their  imports  and  ex-
ports.  The  Large-scale  penetration  by  foreign  capital  in  the 1960s, 
which  at  the  time  was  the  source  of  a  Large  proportion  of  invest-
ment  and  new  jobs,  is no  longer  a  factor  making  for  dynamic  growth. 
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CHAPTER  II  OVERALL  ECONOMIC  MANAGEMENT  MEASURES,  HORIZONTAL 
MEASURES,  THE  ECONOMIC  WEIGHT  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF 
PUBLIC  ENTERPRISES  IN  THE  ECONOMY:  SOME  STRUCTURAL 
EFFECTS 
II.1.  Structural effects of overall  economic  management  measures 
Economic  policy that  is tailored to macroeconomic  objectives  (rate 
of growth,  rate of  inflation, external equilibrium,  level of  em-
ployment),  often with  a  short-term perspective,  has  longer-term 
repercussions  on  industrial  structures and  may,  in  some  cases, 
impose  constraints on  the  adjustment  policies pursued  elsewhere. 
Exchange  rate  policies  illustrate this  problem.  The  effects at 
sectoral  Level  of  an  upward  or  downward  shift  in  the  real  exchange 
rate  (which  does  not  have  altogether  symmetrical  effects)  will 
differ depending  on  the extent  to  which  a  sector is exposed  to 
international  competition and  - for  the sectors which  are  so  ex-
posed- on  the  price elasticity of  demand  for  their products  and 
on  supply  conditions.  A policy aiming  at  a  persistent  depreciation 
may  inhibit  industrial  structures  from  adjusting  towards  the most 
advanced  sectors and  may  reduce  the  impact  of  more  Bpecific mea-
sures  taken  to  foster  better  integration into the  international,di-
vision of  labour.  A strong  currency  policy pursued  in  response  to 
domestic  constraints  (as  in  Belgium)  or  imposed  by  factors  such  as 
the exploitation of  a  natural  resource  (e.g.  North  Sea  oil  in  the 
case of  the  United  Kingdom)  can  exert greater pressure  towards 
adjustment,  and  this may  conflict  with  the public  authorities' 
concern  to  control  the  rate at  which  and  the extent  to which  cer-
tain  less  competitive activities  (e.g.  steel)  are  being  restruc-
tured.  The  present  consensus  in  the  Community  in  favour  of ex-
change  rate stability should  therefore  help  to encourage  adjust-
ment  in  the  countries  where  adaptation  is  needed  most. 
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The  general  thrust  of  credit  and  interest  rate policy may  also be 
inconsistent  with  specific structural objectives.  While  pursuin~ 
restrictive policies,  a  number  of  countries tried to  Limit  some 
~~66~6  ~ of  their  structural  repercussions.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
practice  at  one  time  was  to  issue guidelines to the  banks  indi-
cating certain  types  of borrower  that  were  to  receive preferential 
treatment.  In  France,  ceiling controls on  lending  sometimes 
differed from  one  sector  to  another.  In  Italy,  as  well  as  in 
France,  Loans  at  preferential  rates  are  a  widely  used  instrument. 
In  Germany,  State-backed  Loans  are  another  example.  In  view .of 
(1)  ' 
the  proportions  that  these measures  are  tending  to  assume  in 
some  countries,  consideration  should  be  given  to  their  implica-
tions  for  positive adjustment. 
Overall  demand  management  achieved  by  regulating  public  expendi-
ture also  has  structural effects.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  when 
high  employment  prevails  an  increase  in  public  demand  can  be  fully 
or partially offset  by  a  reduction  in  private demand  (''~eal~ 
crowding-out),  any  increase  in  the  public  sector net  borrowing 
requirement  can  Lead  to more  expensive  and  scarcer financing  for 
the  private sector  ("financial"  crowding-out>  even  where  there 
is  substantial  unused  capacity.  At  present,  efforts are  being 
made  in  almost  all  the  member  countries  to  scale  down  public. de-, 
ficits;  at  the  same  time  the effectiveMess of  public  expenditure, 
including  expenditure  on  industry,  is  being  revi~wed. ·  If  de~i­
cits are  reduced  inter alia by  discontinuing  certain  types  of 
intervention,  there  will  be  greater  scop~ for  encouraging  growth 
points  within  the  productive.sector. 
(1)  In  France,  for  example,  preferential-rate  loans  represented 
almost  44%  of  all  Lending  to  the  economy  at  the  end  of  1979. 
In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  State guarantees  for 
certain  Loans  stood at  DM  143  000  million at  the  end  of  1975, 
or  85%  of  that  year's  Federal  budget. 
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II.2.  The  economic  weight  of  the  State  in the economy 
The  proportion of  GDP  taken  by  general  government  expenditure 
tended  to  increase  sharply during  the  1970s,  as  will  be  seen  from 
the  table  below  and  from  annexed  Table  I.  The  increase  between 
1970  and  1979  ranges  from  57%  for  Luxembourg  to  9%  for  the  United 
Kingdom.  The  figures  recorded  in 1979  range  from  59%  of  GDP 
(Netherlands)  to  43%  (United  Kingdom).  If social  security trans-
fers,  which  are distributive transactions,  are  excluded,  the 
increase  is more  varied  (5%  to 61%)  and  general  government  expen-
diture  as  a  proportion of  GDP  ranges  from  23%  (France)  to  39% 
(Denmark>.  Social  security payments  ~part, the  incre~se in  public 
expenditure  was  accounted  for  by  public  consumption,  other  current 
expenditure  and  subsidies:  in  recent  years,  public  capital  ex-
penditure  as  a  proportion of  GOP  has  tended  to fall. 
Table  1 
General  government  expenditure  as  % of  GDP,  1979 
DK  D  F  IRL  I  NL  B  L  UK 
1 •  Current  and  capital  exeenditure 
54.4  46.6  45.6  44.8  45.6  58.9  49.6  52.6  42.9 
2.  of  which:  social  security expenditure 
15.4  15.7  22.3  12.3  16.1  27.1  20.7  21 .6  11.3 
3.  1.  - 2. 
39.0  30.9  23.3  32.5  29.5  31.8  28.9  31.0  31.6 
4.  % growth  1970-79  (total) 
26.0  24.0  17.0  12.0  27.0  31.0  36.0  57.0  9.0 
5.  % growth  1970-79  (excluding  social  security) 
55.0  40.0  5.0  11.0  42.0  19.0  29.0  61.0  5.0 
Source:  See  annexed  Table  I. 
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The  proportion of  GOP  taken  by  public  expenditure  appears  to bear 
relatively  Little  relationship  to  the declared  preferences  with 
regard  to  the  degree  of  interventionism between  Member  States. 
This  proportion  (even  excluding  social  security payments)  gives 
some  indication  of  the  public  authorities•  responsibility  in  the 
adjustment  process.  In general,  the  public  sector  is Less  subject 
to  market  pressures;  and  so  a  wider  public  sector  may  increase 
the  pressure on  the  productive  sector.  This  could  be  one  of  the 
reasons  for  explaining the difficulties of  adjustment. 
We  must,  however,  be  wary  of over-simplified generalizations  and 
must  take  account  of other  features  of  the  role  played  by  general 
government  in  the  economy,  such  as  the  share  in  wages  and  salaries 
paid,  in  employment  or  in  investment. 
The  following  table  b~ings out  in  particular the  large  share of 
(1)  (2)  .the  wage  and  salary earners  of  the  non-market  services  sector 
and  the  large  share  of  public  capital expenditure.  The  orders of 
magnitude  are  such  that  they  inevitably  lead  to questions  regard 
ing  the  contribution  actually made  to  adjustment  by  the  use  of 
these  resources,  which  are diverted  from  the  market  sectors. 
(1)  It  should  be  adde~ ~hat  these quantitative data  provide 
only  a  direct  illustrat1ori of  the  effects of  general  govern-
ment  activity on  the  economy,  while  the  indirect  effects of 
general  government  demand  on  employment  and  output  can  also 
be  substantial:  see,  for  example,  "Ways  of  analysing  the 
effects of  public  demand  on  sectoral  employment  :  the  case 
of  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany"  by  B.  GORZIG,  where  the 
author  puts the effects  induced  by  public  demand  at  6%  of 
employment  (doc.  II/590/78-EN). 
(2)  the  counterpart  of  which  is  almost  entirely made  up  of 
general  government  expenditure. 
15 Table  2 
Share  of  the  "non-market  services"  sector  in  wages, 
employment  and  investmentt:  1978 
D  F  I  UK  NL  B 
1.  Wages  (%)  (1) 
19.96  19.79  21.09  21.47  23.36  22.31 
2.  Employment  (2) 
16.88  21.67  19.70  23.18  16.94  20. 32' 
3.  1.  as  % of  2. 
(118)  (  91)  (107)  (  93)  (138)  (11 Q) 
4.  Gross  fil<ed  capital  formation  (%)  (3) 
15.66  12.75  9.42  10.43  14.79  16.20 
Source:  EUROSTAT,  ESA 
(1)  Compensation  paid  to  employees  in  non-market  services  as 
% of  compensation  paid to all employees. 
(2)  Wage  and  salary earners  in  general  government  non-market 
services as  % of  total  wage  and  salary earners. 
(3)  Gross  fixed  capital  formation  of  general  government  non-
market  services  as  % of  total  gross  fixed  capital  formation. 
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7~ ~d~d  Although  the  level  of  public  expenditure  has  risen appreciably, 
~ ~  (~~ public  receipts  have  been  adjusted accordingly.  In  1979,  the 
~  ~~  ~- situation  was  as  follows: 
&.e4  Ua-t.e..d) ~ 
~d~-
t.U4e.d.  Table  3 
Taxation  Structure and  weight  as  % of  GOP 
Social  Other  Indirect  Direct  security  current  Total  taxes  taxes  contri- receipts  but ions 
D  12.95  12.63  15.41  2.65  43.63 
F  14.43  7.97  19.87  2.47  44.74 
I  9.51  9.75  14.44  2.50  36.20 
NL  12.51  17.22  18.58  7.30  55.57 
UK  16.40  13.53  6.  21  3.88  39.92 
B  11.61  18.69  12.55  2.39  45.24 
L  12.39  19.50  15.31  5.03  52.24 
IRL  15.64  11 •  81  4.69  5.15  37.29 
D  18.86  24.43  0.63  7.03  50.95 
Source:  Commission  services 
This  table  shows  the  differing  composition  of  taxation  as  between 
member  countries  and  the total  level  of  taxation.  The  latter as-
pect  apart,  the  characteristics of  taxation  may  have  an  impact  on 
production  structures.  This  is notably  so  in  the  case  of  the  tax-
ation of  energy,  social  security contributions  and  the  taxation 
of  company' profits. 
17 7k~r4 
e.u.e.~ ~6 ~ 
~e.ci6~. 
7k~r4 
6~  6e.awU.v-
~6  ••• 
• • • ~~6e.M:-6 a. 
~()M.~ 
B-u4e-t.6 ••• 
The  ta~ation of  energy- and  particularly of oil- in  the  period 
.  (1) 
1974-78  showed  a  definite  tendency  to fall  in  real  terms.  . 
Moreover,  the absolute  level of  ta~ation on  heavy  fuel  oil  is still· 
Low  compared  with  the  Level  for  other  petroleum products,  the 
result  being that  industry has  little incentive to  cut  its con-
sumption.  This  example  is even  more  striking  when  the trend of 
l  I  .  L  .  'b  .  .  'd  d  (2)  emp  oyers  soc1a  secur1ty  contr1  ut1ons  1s  cons1  ere  •  Over 
the  same  period,  the  latter have  increa•ed by  1  1/2  and  2  times 
(3)  ' 
in  absolute  terms  and  as  a  perce~t~ge of  wages  and  salaries, 
while  at  the  same  time  wages  and  salaries  continued  to  rise. 
This  trend  in  the  taxation of energi and  in  social  security con-
tributions may  go  some  way  towards  explaining the  trend  in  rela-
tive  costs of  energy  and  labour  between  1974  and  1978,  which  was 
one  of  the  factors  hampering  adjustment  to the  new  energy situ-
ation  • 
The  trend of  social  security contributions  is one  of  the  aspects 
of  the  general  problem  of  financing  their social  security systems 
which  Member  States  are  now  facing.  In  the  Last  decade,  a  variety 
of  factors  pushed  upexpenditure in this  sector;  they  included 
demographic  trends  and  unemployment  but  also the  cost  of  health 
care.  In  several  Member  States,  the  social  budgets  - which  have 
a  separate  existence - are  in deficit.  It must  here  be  pointed 
out  that  contributions,  which  are  normally  expressed  as  a  percen-
tage  of  wages,  are  Liable  to  increase  Less  rapidly  in  periods of 
pay  restraint,  whereas  a  proposed  cut  in the ·Level  of  social  secu-
rity expenditure  encounters  the  (now  traditional)  resistance. 
(1)  See  annexed  Table  II. 
(2)  See  annexed  Table  III. 
(3)  Except  in  Italy,  where  a  deliberate policy of  charging  a 
proportion of  social  security  contributions  to  general 
taxation  has  been  pursued  in  recent  years. 
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Further,  the  increase  in  contributions  has  a  greater effect  on 
sectors  which  have  a  high  wage  and  salary bill,  some  of  which 
are  particularly exposed  to  the pressures of  internationaL competi-
tion.  Within  the  Community,  there  are  marked  differences  in  the 
Levels  of  social  security  charges  borne by  firms  (employers'· 
social  security  contributions  range  from  16%  of  wages  and  salaries 
in  the  United  Kingdom  to  36%  in  France>.  It  is therefore  impor-
tant  to. redefine  the  social security benefits  which  are directly 
chargeable  to  Labour  costs.  Close  examination  of  some  social 
security budgets  may  well  bring to  Light  categories  of  expenditure 
which  should  be  borne  by  society as  a  whole. 
As  regards  company  taxation,  tax  systems  feature  a  multiplicity 
of  rules  providing  for  different  rates  and  exemptions  or  relief 
f 
.  .  ,  .  .  .  (1)  .  h  L  h .  h  or  certa1n  assets or  certa1n  act1v1t1es  :  t  ese  ru  es,  w lC 
are  often  modified  for  short-term  economic  reasons,  have  impor-
tant  consequences.  In  a  period marked  by  uncertainty with  regard 
to  investment  decisions,  an  examination  should  be  made  of  whether 
greater  simplification of  taxation  should  not  in  general  be  pre-
ferred  to  frequent  tinkering  with  the  rules. 
It  is  also  interesting to  compare  the  ~ax burden  on  firms  and  the 
total  amount  of  public  subsidies  granted' to  them.  In  France, 
for  instance,  private  firms  paid  some  FF  42  000  million  andre-
ceived  some  FF  27  500  million  in  1979.  According  to  certain 
.u,.,_  .dA-~6 .,.  estimates  for  Belgium,  it would  appear  that  government  subsidie.s 
to  industry  have,  in  recent  years,  been  equivalent  to  at  least 
two  thirds of  the  taxes  paid  by  industry.  This  comparison ·in 
fact  masks  deeper-seated distortions:  by  definition, taxation 
hits  firms  which  make  profits,  (2)  while  a  doubtless  growing 
(1)  This  is  the  case,  for  example,  with  rules  on  depreciation, 
which  vary  according  to  th~ category of  assets  in  question. 
(2)  Because  of  the  U.K.  tax  rules  on  depreciation,  the  firms 
whose  net  contributions  are  highest  are  those  which  are 
profitable but  do  not  reinvest  their  profits. 
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proportion of  subsidies  goes  to  firms  in  industries  beset  by 
difficulties. 
The  taxation of  companies'  profits  is  a  major  factor  in  their 
capacity for  adjustment;  some  tendency  seems  to  be  emerging  to-
wards  Lowering  the  level of  such  taxation  as  part  of  the  efforts 
to  increase the profitability of ~irms and  encourage  investment. 
Moreover,  the  tax  treatment  of  inflation  <which  differs from  one 
country  to  another)  may,  in  certain  cases,  penalize  some  firms 
<or  sectors)  more  than  others  because of  their  relative profit-
ability or  indeed  because  of  their  rate of  growth.  Furthermore, 
the  extent  to  which  inflation accounting  is practised  influences 
the  assessments  investors  may  make  of  firms  on  the  basis of  in-
formation  made  available  to  them. 
11.4.  Public  enterprises 
In  all the  countries  of  the  Community,  the  government  is acting 
as  a  producer  through  the  intermediary of  public  enterprises or 
enterprises  in  which  it has  a  holding.  The  variety of  forms  such 
participation takes  makes  it difficult to  estimate  the  scale of 
government  involvement  in  the  economy,  especially since the  sec-
tors  concerned  and  the  Level  of  and  rules  governing  equity parti-
cipations  differ as  between  countries.  Moreover,  the  State's 
role  as  the  principal,  if not  the only  purchaser or  creditor  in 
a  given  sector  can  be  just  as  crucial  as  a  direct  holding. 
However,  it is possible  to  make  out  in  the  various  member  countries 
areas  in  which  the  State is often  involved: 
(i)  public  service  sectors:  transport,  post  and  telecommu-
nications; 
(ii)  traditional  industries:  motor  vehicle  industry,  steel, 
energy,  shipbuilding; 
(iii)  high-technology  industries:  aerospace,  data  processing, 
chemicals,  telematics. 
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Clearly,  the  reasons  for  State participation  have  varied:  in 
some  cases,  nationalisation  has  been  politically motivated, 
while  in  others,  public-service or national-defence  considerations 
have  prevailed;  in  other  cases  again,  intervention  by  the  State 
was  prompted  by  employment  considerations or  by  the financial 
needs  of  a  restructuring operation. 
Whatever  the  initial  reasons  that  lay behind  this  type  of  inter-
vention,  there  is  some  tendency  in  the  member  countries  to  add 
.  l  .  l  h  .  .  .  t  th  .  .  L.  (1)  soc1a  ,  reg1ona  or ot  er pr1or1t1es  o  e  or1g1na  purpose. 
At  the  same  time,  greater burdens  have  been  placed on  national 
budgets  to  finance  the  costs  associated  with  these  new  priorities. 
The  role of public  enterprises  in  the  adjustment  process 
In  some  cases,  government  involvement  may  have  slowed  the  adjust-
ment  process  (e.g.  steel>;  in  others,  the  situation  has  to  be 
seen  in  Less  straightforward terms.  There  are  several  instances 
in  the  Community  of  firms  partly owned  by  the  State proving  to 
be  entirely  competitive  (e.g.  motor  vehicle  industry,  chemicals>, 
and  the  fact  that  the  State is  a  shareholder  has  not  stopped  the 
enterprises  concerned  (cf.  Renault,  Volkswagen)  from  making  sub-
stantial  adjustment  or  rapid  technological  advances. 
For  the  future,  the  pressure  on·  public  deficits  will  strengthen 
the  Member  States'  resolve  to  impose  a  greater measure  of  discip-
line on  public  enterprises.  In  this  respect,  increasing attention 
is  being  paid  to  the  problemr  of  profitability, price  and  cost 
trends,  financing  condit•  .os,  and  control.  In  addition,  public 
enterprises  and  firm~  drtly owned  by  the State  provide  the 
(1)  In  Italy;  for  example,  undertakings  with  State participation 
are  required  by  law  to  earmark  80%  of  new  investment  for  the 
Mezzogiorno. 
21 authorities  with  a  potential  means  of  intervening  in  the  economic 
adjustment  process.  For  instance,  public  enterprises  in  the 
energy sector  can  be  made  use  of  to  adapt .the  supply of  energy 
in  the  transport  sector to  influence energy  consumption  and  in 
the  telecommunications  sector to  provide opportunities  for  de-
veloping  new  technologies. 
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Public  intervention  measures  designed to affect  production  structures 
can  take  a  number  of  very different  forms,  not  all of  which  are. 
equally transparent.  This  makes  it difficult  to offer a  systema-
tic presentation.  It  is even  more  difficult  to  assess  the  relevant 
measures  with  respect  to the objective  they  pursue,  and  even  more 
so  in  terms  of  their  contribution to  positive adjustment.  This 
chapter  provides: 
a  summary  of  available  estimates of  the  scale of  public 
intervention 
a  description of  recent  trends  observed  in  the  Community 
countries 
comments  on  the  ~ffectiveness of  the  main  types  of  inter-
vention. 
111.1.  Some  orders of  magnitude 
~  It  is particularly difficult to quantify measures  influencing  the 
me~d~d ~  d~- supply-side  conditions  (tax  and  financial  incentives,  rules  and· 
~  ~  iudud~  •••  regulations,  action  through  enterprises  in  which  the  State  has  a 
holding,  etc.), and  only  rough  orders of  magnitude  can  therefore 
be  provided.  However,  despite  the  wide  range  of  possible estimates, 
~  ~~  d~- it is obvious  that  the  expenditure  involved  in  intervention  in 
~~~d.  support  of  industry  has  reac~ed significant  Levels. 
'  .  .  (1) 
The  following  estimates  may  be  c1ted: 
GERMANY:  Federal  Government  aid to  industry  (excluding  transport 
and  mining,  but  including  small  firms,  the distributive trades and 
the  services  sector)  amounted  to  OM  5  000  million  in  1978  (0.4%  of 
GOP).  This  figure  does  not  include  the  sizeable  amounts  of aid 
(1)  These  estimates  are  obviously not  comparable  because  of  diffe-
rences  in  methods  of  calculation,  notably as  regards  the  types 
of  measures  included,  their fields  of  application  and  the 
recipients  covered. 
2J ( 1) 
provided  by  the  L~nder.  Other  estimates  indicate  a  figure  of 
some  OM  15  000  million  for  subsidies  and  tax  reliefs granted  by 
the  Federal  Government  and  the  L~nder to  industrial  firms  (exclud-
.  <2>'' 
ing  transport,  but  including  energy)  in  1978. 
BELGIUM:  Interest  subsidies,  capital transfers  and  other  subsidies 
to  firms  in  1978  are  estimated  at  BF 
GOP. (3) 
64  905  million,  or 2.2%  of 
FRANCE:  Financial  flows  from  government  to  industry  <including 
energy)  are  estimated to  have  amounted  to  about  FF  20  000  million 
in  1979  (0.8%  of  GOP),  comprising  some  FF  6  000  million  for  aid  to 
exports,  FF  6  000  million  for  conversion  aid  and  FF  8  000  million 
for  technological  development. (4)  These  funds  are  channelled 
mainly  towards  Large  public or  private enterprises,  taking  various 
forms  (guarantees,  loans,  tax  exemption,  guaranteed  public  con-
tracts,  subsidies). 
ITALY:  Direct  and  indirect  budget  transfers  (including  capital 
appropriations  for  firms  in  which  the  State has  a  holding)  to 
industry,  the  distributive  trades  and  small  firms  in  1978  were 
estimated at  Lit  4  888  000  million,  or  3.3%  of  GOP. (5) 
UNITED  KINGDOM:  Regional  measures,  industrial  innovation  aid, 
selective measures  and  subsidies  for nationalized enterprises 
(excluding  the  transport  sector)  amounted  to£ 1  597  million, 
i.e.  some  0.9%  of  GOP,  in  the  financial  year  1978-79. (6) 
(1)  See  paper  delivered at  the  International  Symposium  on  Indus-
trial Policy  in  the  1980s,  Madrid,  5-9  May  1980: 
Fr.  LANGER,  "L'experience  des  pays  de  L'OCDE  en  matiere  de 
politique  industrielle". 
(2)  See  below,  paragraph  III.2.1. 
(3)  Ministry of  Finance,  Studie~ and  documentation  department: 
"Les  incitants  fiscaux  aux  investissements",  January  1979. 
(4)  See  paper  delivered at  the  International  Symposium  on  Indus-
trial Policy  in  the  1980s,  Madrid,  5-9  May  1980: 
Ch.  STOFFAES,  "L'experience francaise  de  La  politique  indus-
trielle". 
(5)  Ministry  for  Industrial  Affairs:  "Relazione  sullo Stato 
dell'Industria,  November  1979. 
(6)  Public  Expenditure  White  Papers. 
24 Other  estimates,  using  more  uniform  bases,  confirm  this  general 
pattern. 
Table  4 
Total  general  government  expenditure  on  the  economy  Cas  %of  GOP) 
D  F  I  B  UK 
(1975)  (1975)  (1977)  (1976)  (1976) 
Agriculture  0.4  1 .0  0.5  1.2 
Trade.and  industry  0.8  2.8  0.8  1.0 
Transport  and  3.2  3.7  4.8  2.5  communications 
Total  4.4  4.4  7.5  6.1  4.7 
·Source:  EUROSTAT,  1978,  general  government  accounts  and  statistics, 
1970-77. 
For  the  United  Kingdom:  National  Accounts 
F~gures are  also  available on  investment  grants.  Once  again,  how-
' ever,  they  are  not  wholly  comparable  and  give only a  partial  view 
of  the  scale of  intervention,  since tax  reliefs  and  certain finan-
cial benefits  (such  as  interest  subsidies)  are  not  taken  into 
account  • 
1n  the  case  of  some  countries,  the  figures  cover  grants  to  enter~ 
prises  which  are  principally engaged  in  the  production of  goods 
and  non-financial  market  services: 
25 Table  5  a. 
Investment  grants  to  non-financial  corporate  and  quasi-corporate 
enterprises  (as  % of  GOP) 
1970  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
F  0.30  0.27  0.28  0.38  0.67  0.33 
I  0.82  0.52  0.52  0.69  0.73  0.78 
NL  0.36  0.42  0.35  0.37  0.44  0.48 
B  0.24  0.28  0.50  0.53  0.53 
UK  1.14  0.69  0.67  0.66  0.57  0.47 
Source:  SOEC  - National  Accounts  ESA  1976-1977;  1978-2; '1980. 
In  the  case  of  Germany,  the  field  covered  by  the only  figures 
available  is  wider,  and  the  relevant  figures  are  therefore  not 
comparable  with  those  given  above •. The  figures  for  German~ 
in  fact,  include  also  firms  not  organized  in  the  form  of  cor-
porate or  quasi-corporate enterprises. 
Table  5  b. 
Investment  grants  to non-financial  corporate  and  quasi-corporate . 
enterprises,  sole  proprietorships  and  partnerships 
1970  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
FRG  0.74  0.99  1 .13  1.08  1.44  1.33 
Source:  See  Table  5  a. 
2o (5) 
III.2.  Changing  pattern of national  intervention 
III.2.1.  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
(a)  Government  intervention  has  been  characterized recently by 
some  increase  in  the  proportion of  total aid  going  to  industrial 
firms. 
This  development  (1)  has  meant  that  aid  (2)  to  industrial  firms 
in  the  form  of  non-repayable  grants,  tax  relief  and  loans  under 
the  European  Recovery  Programme  (ERP)  increased  from  under  30% 
of  all  subsidies  granted  in  1976  to  over  33%  in  1980,. or  from 
DM  12  500  million  in  1976  to  something  ov~r  DM  15  000  million 
in  1980.  The  data  for  1976  cover all public  aid to ·industrial 
firms,(3)  whether  granted  by  the  Federal  Government,  the  LMnder, 
the  Local  authorities or  under  the  ERP;  the  data  for  1980  con-
cerning  financial  aid  from  the  LMnder  and  the  local  authorities 
and  ERP  Loans  are  not  available.  In  view  of  the  orders  of  mag-
nitude  observed  in  the past,  the  estimate .for  1980  is probably 
too  Low.  From  1976  to  1978,  the  amounts  allocated  to  measures 
in  favour  of  industrial  firms  represented  a  Little  Less  than  3% 
of  the  value  added  of  the  industrial  sector;  forecasts  now  avail-
able  suggest  that  the  percentage  will  be  at  Least  as  high  in  1980. 
(1)  As  described  in  the  6th  and  7th  subsidy  reports,  Bonn,  Bundes-
ministerium  der  Finanzen,  October  1977  and  August  1979.  It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  definition  of  "subsidies" 
in  these  reports  covers  grants,  some  types  of  Loan,  interest 
rebates  and  tax  relief  for  specific purposes.  The  reports 
deal  mainly  with  subsidies  granted at  Federal  Level,  but  also 
include,  with  some  time  Lag,  subsidies  from  the  L~nder and 
the  Local  authorities.  The  reports  cover  subsidies  granted 
to  industry and  households  but  not  subsidies  granted  to  pub-
lic  services  such  as  railways,  post  and  telecommunications, 
infrastructure and  scientific  research. 
(2)  The  measures  dealt  with  here  include only  non-repayable  grants 
and  tax  relief,  since  interest  rebates  are  not  available 
separately for  industry  and  the  exact  nature of  some  Loans 
is difficult  to  define. 
(3)  Including  the  energy  sector,  but  not  including transport. 7A-Jt- .... e.tu/4 tlu.. 
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(b)  The  main  guidelines  for  intervention  in  the  economy  can  be 
summarized  as  follows: 
,. 
some  selectivity is  accepted  as  between  sectors or  regions, 
but  not  as  between  firms; 
intervention  should  help  the  spread of  technological  progress 
either to  certain  types  of  firms_ (small  firms>,  or  to  cer-
tain activities  in  view  of  their,prospective potential; 
the  consequences of  running  down  certain activities should 
be  mitigated  by  spreading  the  readjustment  over  time; 
intervention  instruments  are  specialized to  some  extent; 
fairly  systematic  efforts  to ensure  transparency  (twice-
yearly publication of  orders  of  magnitudes  for  the  main 
types of  subsidy,  and  the  proposed  period of application 
of  measures). 
(c)  The  most  preferred form  of  intervention  is  certainly tax  relief, 
while priority is given  to  helping  firms  adjust  and  to  increasing 
productivity. 
In  1978,  more  than  half  the  total  amount  spent  in  favour  of  indus-
trial firms  took  the  form  of  tax  relief,  although  this  share  was 
lower  than  in 1976.  The  share of  non-repayable  grants  in  the 
total  increased  from  24.5%  in  1976  to over  31%  in  1978.  In  1979, 
63%  of  the  total  (1)  was  allocated to  help  firms  adjust  and  in-
crease productivity,  in  particular  through  tax  relief.  The  remain-
der,  mainly  non-repayable  grants,  was  allocated to  keep  firms  in 
operation. 
(d)  The  total  amount  (2)  of  aid  to  industrial  firms  is also  broken 
down  into the  following  categories:.  regional  aid,  aid  to  certain 
industrial  sectors,  and  measures  to promote  the  spread  of  techno-
logy.  This  breakdown  shows  that  r~~ional development. as  well  as 
(1)  i.e. of  resources  allocated  in the  form  of  non-repayable  grants 
and  tax  relief for  firms. 
(2)  Aid  from  the  LMnder  has  invariably been  considered  regional 
aid  in  this paper. 
28 to  a  Lesser  extent  measures  to  promote  technological  p~ogress are 
preponderent. 
Regional  aid to  industrial enterprises  amounted  to over  DM  6  000 
million  in  1978,  accounting  for  over  40%  of  the  total  Federal 
and  L~nder aid.  Regional  aid  is  mainly  granted  in  the  form  of 
tax  relief;  36%  of  the  German  population  Live  in  assisted areas, 
which  cover  more  than  60%  of  the territory of  the  Federal  Repub-
lic.  No  sectoral  breakdown  of  regional  aid  is available  but  an 
estimate  for  the  period  1969-71  showed  that  the  main  recipients 
were  major  exporting  sectors  such  as  mechanical  engineering, 
chemicals  and  the  motor  industry.(1) 
Since 1977,  rationalization  and  adjustment  of  the  coal  industry 
have  been  second  on  the  list of priorities in  aid  to  industrial 
firms.  It has  almost  alwa~s~been necessary to  help  the  coal 
sector,  but  since 1977,  efforts  have  been  made  to  develop  the 
role of  coal  in the  country's  energy  supply.  Most  of  the  aid 
takes  the  form  of  non-repayable grants,  and  the  extra  aid  since 
1977  has  been  mainly  directed towards  developing  production .and 
improving  mining  techno!ogy. 
Since  1977,  the  share  of  three  industrial  sectors  - aerospace, 
ship-building  and  steel- in  total  aid  to  industry  has  been  in-
creasing;  aid  to  firms  in  these  sectors  always  takes  the  form 
of  non-repayable  grants.(2)  The  main  purpose  of  aid to the 
aerospace  industry is to  help  eXploit  potential  world  demand 
for  certain  types  of  equipment  (e.g.  Airbus  and  BO  105  helicop-
ters>,  while  promoting  development  in  this sector because of  the 
spillover effects on  electronics,  mechanical  engineering  and 
chemicals.  The  main  purpose  of  aid  to  ship-building,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  to  prevent  the  prevailing world  market  situation 
from  having  unduly  disruptive effects on  employment. 
(1)  Carden  and  Fels,  "Public  assistance to  industry",  1976, 
p.  97. 
(2)  In  1978,  the  aerospace  industry and  the shipbuilding  indus-
try each  received  about  DM  400  million  in  grants of  this 
type,  while  the  rest  went  to  the  steel  industry  in  the 
Saar. 
29 The  promotion  of  innovation  and  technological  development  has 
also  been  a  priority aim  of  State  intervention  in  favour  of  in-
dustrial  firms,  particularly· since 1977.  Such  intervention is 
intended  first  to  compensate  for  the disadvantages  of  medium-
sized firms  in  the  field of  R & D:  in 1979,  a  programme  of  sub-
sidies  was  adopted  to  cover  25%  to  40%  of  the  cost  of  staffing 
R & D activities  in  small  and  medium-sized  firms.(1)  Aid  to 
promote  technological  progress ii also  intended  to  encourage  the 
development  and  the  exploitation of  new  products  or  processes 
that  would  improve  the  prospective  Long-term  trend of  productivity. 
The  aid can  be  assimilated to non-repayable  grants:  firms  are  · 
granted 8-year  Loans  at  6.5%,  with  an  interest-free period of 
three  years,  the  Loans  being  repayable  only if the  investment  is 
successful.  Since 1975,  firms  in data-processing,  medical  tech-
nology,  electronic  components,  undersea  exploration  and-exploit-
ation,  mining  technology  and  the exploitation of  raw  materials 
have  received aid of this type. 
111.2.2.  France 
Since  1976,  structural  policy  in  France  has  developed  in  three 
main  ways: 
"horizontal" measures  have  been  increasingly used,  and 
general  measures  to  improve  resource  allocation  have  been 
adjusted,  in  an  attempt  to  promote  en  economic  environ-
ment  that  is more  favourable  to  competitiveness; 
there  has  been  a  change  of  emphasis  in  selective  policies; 
there  has  been  an  attempt  to  re1nforce  and  rationalize 
existing  intervention  instruments. 
(a)  The  authorities  have  adopted  a  series of  general  measures 
~  ~  ~d. (see  below  III.3.3.)  aimed  at  improving  the  operation of  market 
forces. 
For  example,  the  prices  of  industrial products  were  decontrolled 
in 1977,  and  some  prices  in  the  services  and  agricultural. sectors 
have  since  been  decontrolled.  Competition  legislation  was  rein-
forced  in  1977,  both  to extend  the  powers  of  the  Competition 
(1)  Small  and  medium-sized  firms  are  those  employing  Less  than 
1,000  and  with  a  turnover  of  Less  than  DM  150  million. 
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Commission,  and  to  increase  the  effectiveness of  the  legislation 
in  force  concerning  conce~ted practices and  merger  controls. 
Concurrently,  a  systematic  overhaul  of administrative  procedures 
was  begun  in 1977  to  ease  the  burden  on  companies  caused  by  a 
range  of  regulations,  particularly the  rules  governing  th~ acti-
vities of  firms.  The  practical  results of  this  gradual  overhaul 
are  already evident.(1) 
(b)  Until  the early 1970s,  France  pursued  an  industrial policy 
of  selecting and  launching  major  projects  in  certain sectors 
which  were  given priority status  (aerospace,  large  computers, 
chemicals,  nuclear  technology,  steel).  At  the  beginning  the 
projects  reflected a  concern  for  technological  indepe.ndence, 
without  much  regard  to profitability prospects.  Since  1976, 
this  approach  has  been  partially  replaced  by  a  policy aimed  at 
reinforcing  industrial  structures  by  coordinating  public  financial 
assistance over  several  years  in a  small  number  of  fields,  so  as 
to  provide  support  for-the  strategies  pursued  by  successful  firms 
selected on  their own  merits. 
While  the  approach  is still selective, therefore,  emphasis  is 
shifting,  from  major  projects to  specific  areas  of  activity· that· 
are  considered  to  be  of  strategic  importance,  and  to  development 
programmes  proposed  by  the  firms  themselves.  At  the  same  time,  .. 
relations  between  the  Government  and  the  firms  receiving  public 
aid are  increasingly governed  by  multiannual  contracts. 
The  fields for  financial  assistance  are  selected on  the basis 
of  their potential  technological  development,  their  international 
trade potential  and  their  role  in  the  process  of  industrial  de-
velopment.  So  far  the  following·fields  have  been  chosen:  office 
automation;  consumer  electronics;  robotics;  bio-technology; 
undersea  works;  energy-saving  equipment.  These  activities are 
given  medium-term  priority,  and  a  detailed development  programme 
has  been  drawn  up  for  each  one.  · 
(1)  For  e~ample,  improvements  in  the  methods  of  payment  by 
government  departments  for  subcontracted  work  and  for  pur-
chases  of  supplies  and  the  remodelling  of  Legislation  re-
quiring  administrative  authorization  for  Laying  off  redun-
dant  staff. 
3 I One  illustration of this approach  is the  introduction of  devel-
opment  contracts  (1)  in  strategic  industries,  which  enable  avail-
able  public  funds  to  be  concentrated on  promoting  an  industrial 
project  (subsidies,  Loans,  public  purchases,  foreign  investment 
controls,  etc ••• ), while  the  recipient  industries accept  certain. 
commitments  that  can  be  monitored.  The  approach  involving  indi-
vidual  contract  arrangements  is  also  applied  to  public  enter-
prises. 
(c)  Since  1976,  there  has  also  been  an  increase  in  the  resources 
devoted  to specific  purposes  such  as  encouraging  the  setting up 
of new  business  or contributing  to the  own  funds  of  small  and 
medium-sized  firms  and  in  measures  aimed  at  facilitating the  use 
of outside  capital. 
For  example,  a  fund  has  been  created to  guarantee  65%  of  medium-
term  and  long-term  Loans  granted  by  banking establishments  to 
people  setting up  businesses,  and  75%  of  the  Loans  granted  by 
mutual  guarantee  societies.  In  the  initial stage,  this  fund  can 
guarantee  Loans  totalling about  FF  200  million.  In  1979,  a  pro-
gramme  for  increasing the  capital of the  Institut  de  Developpe-
ment  Industriel  (IDI)  was  adopted;  the  Institut  contributes  to 
solving  the  problems  of  rapidly developing  medium-sized  firms 
with  a  shortage  of  own  funds.  In  1979  too,  the  terms  for  assis-
tance  from  the  Societes  de  Developpement  Regional  (SDR)  were 
adjusted.  In  addition,  the  "Lo i  Monory"  adopted  in  1978  aLlows 
individuals  to  deduct  from  their  taxable  incomes  any  proportion 
of  such  income  used  to establish or  extend  a  portfolio of  shares. 
(d)  Since  1976,  efforts  have  also  been  made  to  rationalize  and 
strengthen existing  intervention  instruments.  In  particular, 
there  has  been  some  functional  specialization of  intervention 
instruments. 
(1)  Prepared  by  the  Ministerial  Committee  responsibl~ for  de-
ciding on  guidelines  for  straieg~c  industrial  development 
(the  CODIS,  set  up  in  1979). 
32 The  CIASI,(1)  set  up  in  1974  and  adapted  in 1979,  collaborates 
with  industry  and  finance  (2)  in  finding  viable  solutions  when 
a  firm  comes  up  against  grave  problems,  and  helps  with  loans  in 
quasi-equity form  and/or  subsidies.  Since 1979,  the  CIDISE  (3) 
has  also  been  made  responsible  for  helping  small  and  medium-sized 
firms  that  submit  "forward-looking" projects  likely to  create 
jobs  and  value  added  for  export. 
The  FSAI,(4)  set  up  in  1978,  is specifically responsible  for  pro-
moting  industrial  investment  and  job  creation  in areas  affected 
by  the  problems  of  the steel  industry,  shipbuilding and,  more 
recently,  some  mining  areas.  The  FSAI  grants  subsidies and/or 
subsidized  loans  in  quasi-equity  form.  It  is also  responsible 
for  centralizing the  examination  of  investment  projects,  while 
its management  committee  negotiates  government  assistance  and 
loans  from  the  Credit  National  and  the  Credit  H8telier,  Industriel 
· et  Commercial.  The  FSAI  has  a  considerable amount  of  freedom, 
since its aid  is not  subject  to  any  predetermined  criteria, or 
to  any  published  constraints. 
The  CPME,(S)  set  up  in 1980,  is  a  more  recent  example  of  function-
al  specialization and  rationalization of  intervention  instruments. 
All  the  activities for  financing  the  equipment  expenditure of 
small  and  medium-sized  firms  have  been  brought  together  (6)  under 
the  CPME,  so  as  to  simplify the  procedures  for  obtaining  bank 
credit.  The  Government  is the  major  shareholder  in  the  new  in-
stitution,  which  is alsd responsible  for  providing  small  and 
m~dium-sized firms  with  m~dium-term and  long-term  financing  in 
a  more  decentralized  way. 
(1)  Comite  interministeriel  pour  l'amenagement  des  structures 
industrielles. 
<2>  including  the  CODEFI  (Comites  departementaux .pour  le  finan-
cement>  which  come  under  the  Chambers  of  Commerce,  and  were 
also  set  up  in  1974. 
(3)  Comite  Interministeriel  pour  le  Developpement  des  Investis-
sements  et  le  Soutien  de  l'Emploi. 
(4)  Fonds  Special  d'Adaptation  Industrielle 
.(5)  Credit  d'Equipement  des  Petites et  Moyennes  Enterprises. 
(6)  The  CPME  has  partly or  wholly  taken over  the activities of· 
the  C~isse Nationale  des  Marches  de  l'Etat, the  Credit 
H~telier,  Industriel  et  Commercial  and  the  Groupement  Inter-
professionnel  des  PME. 
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(e)  New  measures  for  the  coordination,  decentralization and  moni-
toring of  public  intervention  have  been  brought  in  since 1976, 
in order to  increase  the  effectiveness of  assistance •. 
Coordination  between  the  various  ministries  has  been  improved, 
and  the  supervision  procedures  for  firms  receiving  FDES  (1)  loans 
or other  industrial  policy assistance  were  adjusted  in  1978. 
This  supervision,  the  responsibility of  the  Economics  Ministry, 
is  aimed  in  particular at  ensuring  that  the  specific  commitments 
undertaken  by  firms  in  order  to obtain public  aid are  respected. 
III.2.3.  Italy 
The  rules  for  financial  assistance  (subsidized  Loans,  the  main 
incentive  employed)  were  reorganized  in  the  second  half of  the 
1970s. 
The  "Fondo  Nazionale peril credito  agevolato"  (2)  was  set  up 
by  Presidential  Decree  902/76;  several  types  of facility de-
signed  for  small  businesses  are  merged  under  this  fund;  35%  of 
the  fund's  resources  are  reserved  for  the  central  and  northern 
regions  of  the  country,  and  65%  for  the  Mezzogiorno. 
Capital  grants,  however,  are  provided  only  for  companies  Located 
in  the  Mezzogiorno  CLaw  183/76>. 
In  1977,  the  Law  on  industrial  conversio~ and  restructuring 
(Law  675/77)  was  adopted,  superceding  most  of  previous  laws, 
which  were  generally  sectoral  in  character.  The  law  established 
a  single  decision-making  and  supervision  body,  the  CIPI  (Inter-
ministerial  Committee  for  Industrial  Policy,  which  also  adminis-
ters  a  fund  for  industrial  restructuring  and  conversion.  The 
Mezzogiorno  was  allocated  40%  of  the  Fund's  resources  and  65% 
of  the  total  available  for  conversion.  To  be  eligible for  the 
financial  assistance  provided  for  by  this  law,  projects must 
(1)  Fonds  de  Deve Loppement  Econom i que  et  SociaL. 
(2)  Until  1976,  the  length  of  assistance  procedures  implied a 
waiting period of  8  to  24  months  from  the  acceptance of  the 
application  to  the  financing  decision;  meanwhile  companies 
were  obliged  to obtain  finance  at  market  rates. 
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fit  in  with  the  sector  plans  approved  by  the  CIPI.(1)  However, 
owing  to delays  in  drawing  up  the  implementing  regulations  (due 
among  other  things  to the difficulty  in  defining criteria for 
intervention>,  the  law  came  into  ope~ation only  in 1980. 
With  the  approach  of  the  expiry of  the  main  laws  on  incentives, 
(at  the  end  of  1980),  a  debate  has ·opened  on  how guidelines and pro-
cedures  for  public intervention  should  be  adapted. In particular, it 
has  been  stressed that  financial  incentives,  mainly  associated with 
fixed  investment,  should  be  reduced,  and  the  emphasis  placed  on 
research  (public  financing  of  R & D has  indeed  been  increasing 
since  1974,  as  a  percentage of  GDP,  but  still represents  only 
about  half  the  equivalent  percentage  in  the other  Member  States>, 
the  dissemination of  R & D results,  more  specific  use  of  public 
purchasing,  improved  vocational  training,  and  the  reinforcement 
of  the  productive tertiary sector,  whose  inefficiency places  a 
heavy  constraint on  expansion. 
It  is generally agreed  that  administrative  procedures  must  be 
simplified as  far  as  possible,  and  ~he element  of discretion  in 
aid  decisions  reduced,  particularly  in  the  Mezzogiorno  and  for 
small  firms;  this might  mean  increasing  the  role of  tax  relief, 
which  becomes  a  more  powerful  incentive  with  the  success  of  mea-
sures  to  control  tax  evasion. 
The  potential  role  of  public  enterprises  in  adjustment  is parti-
cularly  important  in  Italy:  these enterprises  are  numerous  in 
I 
crisis sectors  (steel,  basic  chemicals,  shipbuilding,  the  motor 
industry),  in  advanced  technology  sectors  (electronics,  ele~tro­
mechanics),  in  the  energy  sector  and  in  infrastructures.  This 
means  that  the  problems  of  efficient  management,  financial  sta-
bility and  the  costs  to  public  enterprises  of  assuming  responsi-
bility for  social or  regional  priorities are  probab~y more  aeute 
in  Italy than  in  the other Member  States. 
(1)  Several  "vertical" sector  plans. ha·1e  been  approved,  among 
others  for  base  chemicals  and  chemical  products,  fibres, 
fertilizers,  steel,  paper,  instrument  engineering,  electronics, 
textiles  and  clothing and  the  food  industry,  and  three "hori-
zontal"  plans,  for  the efficient use  of  energy  and  raw  ma-
terials  in  production  processes~  improved  organization of 
the marketing  abroad  of  manufactured  goods,  and·the  develop~ 
ment  of  equipment  to  reduce  the  adverse  ecological  impact  of' 
production  processes. 
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III.2.4.  United  Kingdom 
Industrial  policy  in  the  United  Kingdom  has  undergone  a  number  of 
major ·changes  since 1979,  directed  towards  restoring and  reinfor-
cing  the  role of  the  market  and  reducing  public  intervention. 
Regional  policy  has  been  made  more  selective and  more  con-
centrated: 
Regional  aid,  which  is estimated to  have  amounted  to about 
£ 900  million  in  1979,  is to  be  reduced  by  about  40%  in 
real  terms  over  a  three-year period.  In  1979,  40%  of  the 
working  population  lived  in  the  various  assisted  areas: 
special  development  areas,  development  areas,  intermediate 
areas.  By  1  August  1982,  the  extent of these areas will 
have  been  gradually  reduced  so  that  only  about  25%  of  the 
working  population  will  live  in  them~ 
At  the  same  time,  intervention  instruments  have  been  reappor-
tioned:  regional development  grants,  which  were  automatic, 
represented  63%  of  regional  aid  in  1978  and  1979;  they  have 
been  abolished for  intermediate areas,  and  the  rate of  aid 
as  a  percentage of eligible assets  has  been  reduced  from  20% 
to  15%  in  development  areas.  The  minimum  eligible  investment 
expenditure  has  been  increased to £500  for  plant  and  equip-
ment  and  to £5,000  for  buildings.  Selective  (and  discre-
tionary)  regional  aid  granted  under  Section  7 of  the 1972 
Industry Act  has  not  been  changed;  a  scheme  was  introduced 
in  April  1980  to  subsidize  the  costs of  in-plant  training 
schemes  associated  with  modernization or  job-creating in-
vestment  projects.  Subsidies  to  help  with  certain  costs  of 
transferring  firms  to  assisted areas  were  discontinued  in 
July 1979,  but  Labour  mobility subsidies  were  maintained. 
As  regards  selective measures,  the  best  way  to  support  certain 
activities, particularly in  the  high-growth  sectors,  is still 
a  matter  of  debate  with  a  certain emphasis  being  put  on  an  in-
creased  use  of  public procurement as an policy instrument. 
The  industrial  strategy  introduced  in  November  1975  was  based 
on  an  essentially sectoral  approach  with  a  rather  high  Level 
of  disaggregation  (into  ~bout forty sectors)j ·a  systematic  ' 
economic  analysis of each  sector  is carried out  by  the  Sec-
toral Working  Parties,  set  up  on  a  tripartite basis under-
the  auspices  of  the  National  Enterprise  Development  ~ouncil. 
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This  approach  was  justified because  the  more  general  poli-
cies  pursued  from  the  1960s  onwards  had  not  solved the  prob-
Lems  of  productivity and  trade  performance  in ·industry; 'the 
main  weakness  of  the  approach  was  that  specific analyses  at 
disaggregated  Level  could  not  be  synthesized,  although  this 
could  have  made  it possible  to. integrate general  measures 
affecting  the  industrial  climate,  and  to  achieve  greater 
coherence  with  macroeconomic  policies.  Therefore  although 
the  analysis  was  valid,  and  although  some  of  the  recommen-. 
dations  did  Lead  to  government  intervention,  the practical 
results  have  been  Limited. 
··.~. 
One  of  the  central  elements of  the  strategy was  to  determine 
domestic  and  international  market  shares  for  each  of  the 
manufacturing  branches  concerned;  this  illustrates the  risk 
inherent  in sectoral  approaches  that  inadequate  account 
might  be  taken of trends  and  potential  reactions of trade 
partners. 
Nevertheless,  sectoral  working  parties  remain  an  essential 
instrument  of  analysis  to  identify bottlenecks or  poten-
tial  at  company  Level,  and  thus  to  supply  basic  information~ 
for  intervention measures. 
The  Selective  Investment  Scheme  (1972-79>,  which  has  now  ex-
pired,  supplied about+ 1::79  million  in  aid,  mainly to engi-
neering,  at  a  rate of-one-tenth of the  private capital;  aid 
supplied under  Section  8  of  the  1972  Industry Act  to specific 
sectors  (textiles,  footwear,  machine  tools,  printing machin-
ery,  electronic  components,  etc.>  has  now  been  discontinued, 
but  the  Government  has  expressed  its intention  to  aid pro-
jects of  "national  interest". 
The  Government  is  committed  to  reducing direct  intervention 
by  the  State  in  its role  as  a  producer  by  returning certain 
segments  of  public  enterprises to the  private  ~ector and  re-
ducing  State monopoly  of  certain  products. 
The  need  f~r.public enterprises  to attain financial  target~' 
has  been  reaffirmed,  and  required  rates of  return '(1)  h~ve. 
been  defined  for  gas and  electricity;  moreover,  annual  cash 
Limits  on  external  financing  of  whatever  source  (Loans,  re-
payments  from  the  Treasury,  etc.)  have  been  defined  for  all 
nationalized enterprises.(2) 
(1)  The  required  rate of  return  is calculated on  the  basis of  the 
total  new  investment. 
(2)  The  1978  White  Paper  did  not  solve  the  problem  of  the  relaiiqn 
between  the  required  rate  of  return,  cash  limits  and  the 
pricing  policy of  public  enterprises.  It  has  still not .been 
settled. 
37 The  National  Enterprise  Board  (NEB),  set  up  in  1975,  is  a 
State  holding  company  which  intervenes  through  the  acquisi-
tion of  holdings  or  ihrough  public  loani from  the  public 
purse;  up  till now,  its  resources  have  for  the  most  part 
been  devoted  to  rescue operations  (British  Leyland,  Rolls 
Royce,  Herbert  Tools>.  The  guidelines  laid  down  by  the 
Government  in  August  1980  define  the  main  areas  for  NEB  in-
vestment  activity:  besides  companies  in  which  it already 
holds  interests,  those  developing or exploiting  advanced 
technology  (the  acquisition  of  a  holding  in  Inmos  for  the 
development  of  microprocessors  was  recently  confirmed),  and 
those  located  in  assisted areas.  The  NEB's  role  in  connec-
tion  with  small  and  medium-sized  firms  has  now  been  limited 
mainly  to granting  Loans,  and  no  more  holdings  will  be  ac-
quired. 
111.2.5.  Belgium 
W~  Largely  under  the  "Lois  d'expansion  economique",  central government 
(j..t  ~d~,  • •  intervention  in  Belgium  in  the  1960s  primarily took  the  form  of 
general  incentives.  These  encouraged' the  inflow of  foreign  invest-
ment  and  also  contributed to  the  progressive  internationalization 
of  Belgian  industry,  one-third of  whose  value  added  is attributable 
to  multinationals.  In  1970  a  new  Law  on  expansion  adjusted  the 
range  of  incentives  and  at  the  same  time  defined  the  conditions 
for  implementing  the  contractual  policy  whereby  companies  were  to 
obtain  advantages  provided  that  they  acted  in  accordance  with  the 
guidelines  laid down  in  the  Plan.  Steps  have  recently  been  taken 
to  strengthen direct  public  initiative  (the  Law  on  public  economic 
initiative,  which  adapted  the  function  assigned  to  the  Societe 
-w.id.e.w  a-1- ~dbvi-d  Nationale  d'Investissement>,  and  a  fairly  fundamental  review  of 
~...  industrial  policy was  undertaken  in  1978.  These  developments 
were  due  to  the  unsatisfactory  results of  the  industrial policy 
implemented  since  1960,  to industrial  problems,  in  par~icular as 
regards  employment,  to  an  excessive multinationalization  of  the 
Belgian  economy  and  to the  need  for  a  macroeconomic  strategy of 
industrial  redeployment.  The  new  orientations  cover  the  modern-
ization of  traditional  sectors,  specialization  in  advanced  pro-
ducts  and  systems,  the  promotion  of  industrial  research  and  the 
transfer of  technology,  and  the  reduction of  dependence  on  the ~~~~ 
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rest  of  the  world.  The  introduction of  this policy  in 1978  was~ 
accompanied  by  the  setting up  of  regional  investment  corporations 
and  of  the  "Fonds  de  Renovation  Industrielle". 
Sectoral  guidelines  were  Laid  down  in  the  1975-1980  Plan,  but  in 
fact  the  only  sectors  which  have  been  the  subject  of  sectoral 
policy are  steel, textiles,  shipbuilding  and  repair  and  hollow 
glass. 
Finally,  as  a  result  of  what  was  felt  to  be  a  lack  of  coordination 
and  transparency  in  the  various  instruments  of  State  intervention 
and  a  lack  of  precise objectives,  the  guidelines  recently adopted 
for  1981-1985  are  designed  to  ensure  closer  liaison between  inno-
vation,  public  procurement  and  externa~ markets:  for  example, 
the  "Commission  d1orientation et  de  coordination  des  commandes 
publiques"  (Commission  on  Public  Procurement  Policy)  is  required 
to prepare  a  medium-term  programme  for  public  contracts,  to  make 
an  inventory of  the  future  technological  needs  of  government 
departments  and  to  propose  measures  aiming at  promoting  new  pro-
ducts  and  equipment  which  would  hold  their own  against  foreign 
competition.  Moreover,  as  regards  research  and  development,  the 
guidelines  recently adopted  aim  to  make  State  intervention more 
selective,  on  the  basis  not  only of scientific criteria proper. 
but  also of  marketing  possibilities. 
As  regards  institutional  organization,  there  has  been  a  recent 
trend  to  transfer  major  responsibilities  in  industrial policy to 
the  regional  level,  except  for  the  so-called "national" sectors  -
steel, textiles,  shipbuilding  and  repair,  and  hollow  glass. 
111.3.  Comments  on  the effectiveness of  the  main  types  of  instru-
ment 
(a)  The  relevant  instruments  may  be  grouped  according  to their 
impact  on: 
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companf  inputs  (capital,  Labour,  energy) 
methods  of  organization  and  the  technology  used  by  companies 
the  markets  on  which  the  companies  sell their products. 
Obviously  this  breakdown,  Like  any  other,  is partly arbitrary: 
it  ignores  the  fact  that  in  practice certain policy  aims  - the 
promotion  of  research  for  example  - may  be  reflected  in  measures 
designed  to  have  an  impact  on  the  cost  of  capital or  Labour  (such 
as  subsidies  tied  to  spending  on  manpower  engaged  in  research  and 
development)  or  to  have  a  direct  impact  on  markets  (such  as  the 
multiannual  public  procurement  programme  for  a  high  technology 
sector>.  Similarly,  certain  investment  incentives  may  be  geared 
to  the  creation of  jobs.  The  annex  gives  a  number  of  examples 
of  national  measures  and  illustrates the  considerations  set out 
be Low. (1) 
(b)  Before  considering  each  type  of  instrument  in  detail,  it 
should  be  stressed that  a  series of  individual  measures,  even  if 
very  well  planned  technically,  do  not  constitute an  industrial or 
structural  policy  unless  they  are  articulated and  together  serve 
one  or  more  common  objectives.  For  instance,  a  particular aid 
to  research  in  a  given  sector  (e.g.  telecommunications)  may  in 
present  circumstances  prove  ineffective unless it  is  accompanied 
by  measures  relating  to  the  demand  for  the  products  concerned or 
to  the  skills  needed  to  produce  them. 
(c)  Finally,  the  contribution of  a  particular measure  to  positive 
adjustment  cannot  in  some  cases  be  determined  in advance;  rather, 
the  conditions  under  which  the  measure  is applied  may  determine 
its  contribution  to  adjustment.  For  example,  assistance measures 
to  small  and  medium-sized  firms  may  produce  different  results  in 
f'l-6-.d~~ ~d~.  terms  of  adjustment  depending  on  whether  the  firms  are mostLy  in 
high-growth  sectors or  whether  they  are  for  the  most  part  in 
(1)  For  a  general  survey of  the  main  adjustment  measures,  see 
also:  D.K.  STOUT,  "Adjustment  Policies on  the  European 
Continent",  International  Symposium  on  Industria,L  Policies 
in  the  1980s,  Madrid,  5-9  May  1~80. 
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traditional  sectors.  Similarly,  measures  in  favour  of  employment  .  r'; 
can  be  assessed  in different  ways  depending  on  whether  they are 
designed  to  reduce  Labour  costs or to  adapt  the  structure of  the 
Labour  supply  to  demand. 
111.3.1.  Measures  affecting the  inputs  of  firms 
(a)  Capital 
The  purpose  of  investment  incentives,  whether  tax  incentives  or 
financial  incentives,  is  t6  decrease ·the  cost  ~f capital  of  firms 
or  the  uncertainty attached  to  their  investment  decisions.  AL-
though  capital  formation  has  always  been  a  priority aim  of  govern-
ment  intervention,  the  increased  investment  required  to ensure 
adjustment  and  to  Lower  unemployment  has  recently  Led  to  an  in-
crease  in  the  range  of  incentives  used. 
Tax  incentives  are  usually horizontal  measures;  they  are  rarely 
adapted  to  particular sectors  or  regions.  Changes  in  this  type 
of  incentive over  time  often  reflect  cyclical  preoccupations. 
Different  arrangements  are  possible  (changes  in  depreciation 
allowances,  the  possibility of  deducting  some  investment  expen-
diture  from  taxable  amounts, -etc.).  The  disadvantage  of  this 
instrument  is that  its  cost. is  Less  transparent  (although  it  can 
( 1 )  . 
be  evaluated),  partly because  of  the  accumulation  over  time 
of  different  incentive  schemes.  Neveriheless,  for  the  entre-
preneur,  it  has  the  advantage of  being  automatic  and  can  there-
fore  be  reliably  incorporated  in  investment  calculations.  The 
relative  frequency of  changes  in  tax  incentives  suggests  th~t 
they  could  perhaps  be  more  effective  if they  were  designed  from 
the outset  with  a  more  structural  purpose  in  view,  and  if they 
were  not  merely  tinkering at  the  margin. 
(1)  Such  incentives  are  indeed  regularly evaluated  and  the 
figures  published,  for  example  in  Germany  in  the  "Subven-
tionsbericht". 
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Financial  incentives  (subsidies,  interest  rebates,  etc.)  are 
mostly  associated  with  sectoral  or~ more  usually,  region~L ad-
justment  programmes.  This  is  because  they  ~re more  flexible 
than  tax  measures,  and  because  they  can  be  more  specifically 
Linked  to  commitments  on  the  part  of  the  recipients.  This  per-
haps  explains  why  financial  incentives  have  tended  to  increase 
in  recent  years.  To  the  extent  that  there  is  a  Large  element 
of  discretion  in  the  decision  to grant  this  type of  incentive, 
there  is  a  risk  that  resources  might  be  misallocated,  or  that 
the  measures  will  be  essentially defensive. 
Subsidized credit,  which  is  widely  used  as  an  instrument,  for 
example  in  Italy, gives  rise  to  specific problems.  Since  the 
financial  establishments  granting  subsidized  Loans  must  fulfil 
a  role that  extends  beyond  banking  as  such,  management  may  be 
more  cumbersome  and  their efficiency  in  the  resource  allocation 
process  may  be  affected.  Experience  in  this  area  would  seem  to 
point  to  the  advantages  of  fairly automatic  and  easy-to-manage 
incentives. 
(b)  Labour 
As  regards  measures  affecting the  cost  of  labour or  the  conditions 
of  labour  utilization, the  serious  problems  encountered  since  1975 
have  sometimes,  because  of  job  Losses,  led  to  the  adoption  of 
measures  (such  as  aids  to  maintaining  jobs)  which,  although  jus-
tifiable  in  the  short  term,  have  in  practice tended  to maintain 
the  status  quo  - at  substantial  cost  in  terms  of  resources  diver-
ted  from  the  pursuit  of  other objectives. 
However,  in  view  of  budget  constraints  and  since  the  measures  have 
proved  ineffective  in  restoring  competitiveness, other  measures 
have  been  gradually  worked  out  in  most  of  the  Member  States  to 
deal  with  unemployment  in  a  way  more  consistent  with  positive ad-
justment:  such  measures  include  vocational  training measures, 
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grants  or  tax  reliefs  for  the  creation of  new  jobs  (particularly 
for  certain  categories of  workers),  measures  designed  to  spread 
the  burden of  large-scale  redundancies  in  certain  depressed  sec-
tors,  and  measures ·to  substitute State  financing  for  a  proportion 
of  employers'  social  security contribution.  In  the  present  situ-
ation,  even  measures  whose  sole effect  is to  increase  recruitment 
can  be  useful. 
However,  in  circumstances  where  the  factors  of  immobility are 
tending to  increase,<1> and  where  labour  costs  remain  high,_ 
vocational  training  measures  should probably  be  given  special 
priority.  It  is  interesting that  this type of  measure  has  be~n 
very  important  in  Germany  ·for  the  past  few  years,  while  Little 
has  been  done  in other  countries  - although  some  change  is  now 
apparent.  Obviously,  the  success  of  such  measures  depends  partly 
on  institutional  struc~ures (e.g.  a  narrower  range  of after-tax 
incomes  may  mean  less  incentive to  improve  skills),  and  also on 
prospects  for  new  jobs:  workers  will  be  less  resistant  to  mobi-
lity if they  can  be  guaranteed  substitute  jobs.  Nevertheless, 
an  efficient  vocational  training policy may  contribute signtfi-
cantly to  help  solve  the  unemployment  problem,  which  is one  of· 
the  most  serious  adjustment  problems. 
(c)  Energy 
It  is  also essential  to  ease  the  constraints  placed on  growth  in 
the  Community  by  energy,  because  of  its share  in  imports  and  be~ 
cause  of  the  risk  of  -exh·austion  of  supplies.  Me?sures  to  en-
courage  energy  saving  in  production  processes or  at ,the  final 
consumption  stage  could  significantly affect.behaviour if they 
were  accompanied  by  a  suitable price policy to guide  the  market. 
(1)  Owing,  first,  to-the  general  inadequacy of  vacancies,  but 
also  to  the  increase  in  home  ownership  and  to  the  fact  that 
in  more  and  more  families  both  husband  and  wife  have  jobs. 
4J Important  measures  have  already  been  taken  in  some  Member  States, 
for  example  tax or financial  incentives  for  energy-saving  invest-
ment,  the  renovation of  industrial buildings,  or  the  installation 
of  approved  heat ·insulation,  and  measures  to  promote  new  energy-
saving  technologies. 
III.3.2.  Measures Qperating on  technology  and  organization  methods 
In  order  to  reinforce  business  performance  and  competitiveness, 
governments  in  the  Member  States  also participate directly  in  re-
search,  or  promote  concentration  and  association  between firms  so 
as  to  take  advantage  of  economies  ot  scale. 
(a)  Government  expenditure on  research  and  development  (R  & D), 
while  varying  fairly considerably  froni  one  country to  another, 
has  picked  up  again  during  recent  years,  as  the  annexed  graphs 
show. (1) 
It  will  be  seen  in particular that  there  is  a  very  sharp diffe-
rence  between  public  R & D ~ppropriations as  a  proportion  of  GDP 
in  Germany,  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  on  the  one  hand,  and 
in  Italy on  the other;  the  relevant  proportion  has  been  rising 
again  in  Italy since  1974,  and  in  Germany  and  France  since  1976-
1977.(2) 
The  priorities attached to  the  different  aims  pursued  through 
public  R & D appropriations  vary  Little over  time,  but  they differ 
substantially from  one  country  to  another. (3) 
(1)  See  annexed  graphs. 
(2)  Government  financing  of  research  and  development,  1970-79: 
Eurostat,  1980. 
(3)  se• Table  IV  annexed. 
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For  example,  defence  research  accounts  for  Less  than  5%  in  Italy 
and  over  50%  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The  general  promotion  of 
knowledge  (1)  accounts  for  over  55%  in  the  FRG,  compared  with 
Less  than  22%  in  the  U.K.  Technological  objectives  account  for 
16%  of  R &  0  appropriations  in  the  United  Kingdom,  compared  with 
40%  in  Italy.  Moreover,  efforts  in this field  are  very selective: 
for  example,  nuclear  fission  accounts  for  a  Large  proportion of 
R & 0 financing  for  energy  research;  the  same  is  true of  the 
share  of  electronic  equipment  and  aircraft  construction  in  indus-
trial R & 0 financing,  and  of  that  of  Launchers  and  satellites 
in  space  R &  0  financing.· 
The  share  of  industrial  productivity and  technology projects  in 
total public  R & 0  appropriations  is  increasing  very  slowly  in 
Germany  and  Belgium,  and  decreasing  significantly  in  the  other 
countries. 
Public  spending  on  R & 0  raises  a  number  of questions.  Emphasis 
.  .  I 
on  areas  having  direct.economic  spin-offs  has ~erhaps not  always 
been  sufficient  in all ~ember States.  A greater effort  to  channel 
expenditure  in  this direction  seems  called for,  particularly in 
present  circumstances  where,  because of  the deterioration  in  the 
economic  climate,  firms  tend  to  give  preference  to  Low-risk  pro-
jects. 
The  effectiveness  of  government  R & 0  spending  depends  very  cri-
tically on  the  efforts  made  to spread  the  results;  on  this point 
some  improvements  are  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  the  economic 
exploitation  of  results  as  well  as  the  application of  new  tech-
nologies  developed  abroad. 
(1)  This  covers  basic  research  in  the  exact  and  the  natural 
sciences,  and  medical  and  engineering  research  as  well  as 
research  in  the  social  sciences. 
45 Cb>  Government  financing  of  R & D also. includes  supporting  firms' 
own  R & D activities  in  various  ways. (1)  Although  precise  figures 
are  not  available,  it is estimated that,  in  1975,  public  funds 
financed  17.9%  of  R & D in  industry  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  25.4%  in  France,  30.9%  in  the  United  Kingdom,  6.5%  in 
Italy and  6.2%  in  Belgium. (2)  A breakdown  of  the different  types 
of  assistance  to  firms'  R & D is given  in  Table  V.  It  is parti-
cularly  interesting to  note  the  proportion  accounted  for  by 
assistance to  selected  technologies  in  Germany  in  comparison  to 
the proportion of  assistance  given  without  sector  consideration 
in  France. 
Several  Member  States  are  also trying  to  influence  concentration 
and  association  between  firms  by  acquiring  government  holdings 
(where  appropriate,  through  the  agency of  public  enterprises>, 
by  encouraging  concentration  and  by  supporting  plans  for  associ-
ation  agreements.  These  measures  are  often  part of  a  selective 
sectoral  approach,  and  may  be  used  in crisis sectors  - for  example, 
the  restructuring of  the  steel  ind~stry in  France,  the  interven-
tion  (until  recently)  of  the  National  Enterprise  Board  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  especially  in  the  motor  industry,  or  the  inter-
vention  of  the  "Societe  Nationale  d'Investisserrient"  in  Belgium. 
They  may  ~Lso be  used  in  potentially  high-growth  sectors, or, 
when  required,  in  high-risk  sectors  (e.g.  telecommunications  and 
the  nuclear  industry  in  France;  holdings  acquired  by  the  National 
Enterprise  Board  in  the  United  Kingdom,  etc ••• ).  There  is a·very 
great  risk  that  intervention of  this  type  in  declining  sectors 
will  have  adverse  effects  on  adjustment. 
C1>  General  or selective tax  and  financial  incentives  granted 
for  research  projects  undertaken  individually or  collectively; 
tax  arrangements  for  the  purchase  and  assignment  of  patents 
and  Licences;  advisory  services,  technical  assistance,  in-
formation,  joint  research;  support  for  selected technologies. 
See  Table  V annexed. 
(2)  See:  "Mesures  directes  et  indirectes de  promotion  de  La  R & D 
industriels dans  les  Etats  membres  des  Communautes  Europeennes", 
J.M.  Didier  & associes,  December  1979. 
A more  recent  estimate  shows  that  external  financing  accounted 
for  7%  of  R & D expenditure  by  private  firms  in  Italy  in  1978 
(see  Confindustria:  "La  spesa  dell'industria  pr.ivata  per  La 
ricerca  scientifica 1976-1978",  Rome,  October  1979). 
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such  firms,  are  intended  to  allow  SMEs  to benefit  from  economies 
of  scale  in their access  to capital,  information,  technology  and 
certain  services  connected,  for  example,  with  market  exploration 
and  penetration.  These  measures  are  usually horizontal  and  rela~ 
tively cheap,  and  they  seem  to  contribute  to  positive adjustment. 
Financing  is  provided  in  France  by,State·participation  in  guaran-
teeing  loans  to  SMEs  and  by  the  financial  intervention of  the 
"Credit  d'Equipement  des  PME"  and  the  "Agence  Nationale  pour  La 
·creation d'entreprises".  In  Italy, the  IMI  provides  financing 
on  favourable  terms  for  investments  by  SMEs.  In  Germany,  loans 
on  favourable  terms  have  been  granted  since 1979  for  setting. up 
SMEs,  and  a  series of  new  tax  measures  wi L  ~ from  1980-19811 re-
duce  the  basis of  asse~sment for  taxing  both  the trading profits 
and  the  trading  capital of  SMEs.  The  tax  arrangements  in  force 
in  the  United  Kingdom  are  particularly favourable  to SMEs,  and 
these  businesses  can  also  obtain  advice  (particularly from  the 
NEB)  and  assistance  in  relation  to  the  Labour  costs  i~volved in 
creating  new  jobs.  In  Germany,  there  is  a  government  programme 
to  encourage  expenditure  by  smaLL  f i.rms  on  IL.&__Q,  and  in  France, 
small  firms  subcontracting  R & D projects  can  obtain financial 
support  for  this, as  well  as  for  expenditure  incurred  in  incor-
porating  new  technologies  in  production  processes. 
11I.3.3.  Measures  acting  on  markets 
Government  intervention  on  markets  where  companies  sell their 
products  appears  in  very different  forms  which,  despite  the  fac~ 
that  they  do  not  involve  direct  financial  transfers,  can  have 
major  consequences  for  the  allocation of  resources  arid  thereby 
for  the  scale  and  speed  of  adjustment. 
Public  procurement  accounts  for  a  Large  proportion of  demand  in 
a  number  of  sectors.  Although  a  detailed assessment  has  not  been 
possible,  it has  been  noted  that,  for  example,  public  purchasing 
of  industrial  products  represented  more  than  10%  of  the  gross 
47 .value  added  of  the  industrial  sector  (including  energy)  in  France 
in  1978.  In  Belgium,  public  purchasing  <works,  supplies  and  ser-
vices)  accounted  for  5.8%  of  GOP  in  1979.  Table  6  shows  the 
proportion of  GOP  accounted  for  by  public  consumption  (e~cluding 
salaries and  remunerations)  together  with  gross  fixed  capital 
formation  by  the  general  government  in  the  Member  States. 
Table  6 
Public  consumption  <excluding salaries  and  remunerations)  + 
general  government  gross  fixed  capital  formation  as  % of  GOP 
D  F  I  UK  B  NL 
1979  12.20%  6.55%  6.69%  9.86%  8%  7.63% 
Source:  Commission  departments  (see  Annex  1) 
These  data  cover  only  general  government.  However,  nationalized 
firms  may  also account  for  a  Large  share  in  the  purchase  of  goods 
and  services.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  for  example,  investment  by 
the  nationalized  firms  represented  between  15%  and  20%  of total 
GFCF  in  recent  years,  i.e.  about  2.5%  to  3%  of  GOP. 
Public  procurement  accounts  for  the  major  share of  national  mar-
kets  in  some  sectors  such  as  defence  (closely associated  with 
civil  aerospace),  telecommunications,  transport,  energy  and  data-
processing.  Procurement  policy  is  sometimes  used  to  promote 
development  in  certain sectors.  In  France,  a  major  investment 
programme  has  been  undertaken  in  the  telecommunications  sector 
with  the  explicit  aim  of  improving  the  competitiveness  of  the 
sector.  In  the  United  Kingdom; a similar  programme  involves 
'railway transport  equipment.  In  some  Member  States  at  Least, 
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national  products  are  given  preference  for  government  purcha~ing 
of  data-processing  equipment. 
The  objectives  pursued  by  public  procurement  policy  can  affect 
the  adjustment  process;  an  assessment  of  such  effects  should  in 
particular take  the  possible  cost  of  national preference  into 
consideration.  This  cost  is  such  that  ~ny adjustment  policy 
involving public  procurement  ought  to be  extremely  selective 
and  wholly  transparent.  It would  at all events  be  useful  if 
government  programmes  and  planned  expenditure  could  be  announced 
well  in  advance,  since  research,  investment  and  production  may 
require  Long  periods  of  time,  particularly  in  advanced  technology 
sectors. 
G  l .  d  .  l  d  .  .  ' 1}  .  b .  enera  1ze  pr1ce  contro  s  an  mon1tor1ng  requ1re  a  cum  er-
some  administrative  structure and  may  Lead  in  practice to  delays 
or  distortions  in  the  adjustment  of  relative prices,  thus  affect~ 
ing  the  rate of  return  and  business  investment  decisions.  These 
effects  on  the  capacity of  firms  to  adjust  are  the  main  reason 
why  some  Member  States  have  decided  in  recent  years  to dismantle 
price  controls  and  to  adapt  competition  rules.  It  is too early 
yet  to assess  the  results .of  this  change  of  policy. 
Freedom  of  prices  has  been  gradually  reintroduced  in  France 
since  1977,  while  the  control of  concerted practices  and  mergers 
has  been  tightened.  The  aim,  in  view  of  France's  long  exper-
ience  of  price  controls,  is  to  speed  up  innovation,  technical 
progress  and  the  rationalization of  industrial  structures  while 
allowing  for  the  need  to  fight  against  certain price  rises  and 
to  protect  consumers. 
(1}  Which  may  be  intended  for  cyclical  purposes,  or. in.order 
to  control  monopolies,  achieve  certain social  aims  or 
influence  production,  bring  about  structural  developments 
in  the  economy,  etc. 
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Price  superv1s1on  and  all other  forms  of  government  price control 
were  discontinued  in  1979  in  the  United  Kingdom  after some  twelve 
years  of  a  prices  policy  that  had  demonstrated that  price  con-
trols  tend  to  Limit  the  impact  of  changes  in  relative prices 
without  being  used  to bring  about  sec.toral  change.·  A residual 
power  to  require  structural  changes  in  industry  (following .an 
enquiry  into its conduct  and  performances)  has  now  been  trans-
ferred  to the  Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission.  Similarly, 
the  determination of  "acceptable"  prices  is  rarely flexible 
enough  to  allow  for  investment  needs,  for  improved  quality or 
for  the  need  to  finance  new  products  from  the  income  accruing 
from  the  sale of existing products  at  higher  prices.  Nev~rthe­
Less,  structural  weaknesses  in  a  particular sector  have  sometimes 
been  revealed  by  an  enquiry  into its prices.  Finally,  the  ex-
perience  of  price  controls  also  demonstrated  the  interactions 
between  prices  policy and  incomes  policy  as  well  as  the  Limited 
effects of  price  controls  on  rates of.fnflation. 
Rules  and  regulations  concerning  product  standardization,  environ-
mental  protection and  health  and  safety standards  are  justified 
as  a  rule  by  the  need  to take  into account  certain social  costs 
that  would  certainly arise if there  were  no  rules,  but  they  may 
also  act  as  a  constraint  on  adjustmen~.  Where  problems  do  arise, 
they  appear  in  most  cases  to  involve  aspects  such  as  the  trans-
parency of  the  measures,  their mutual. consistency,  or  the  oppor-
tunities  for  introducing  them  g~adually.  Further,  to the  extent 
that  they  have  a  direct  effect  on  conditions of  access  to  the 
market,  such  measures  affect  the  possibility of  exploiting eco-
nomies  of  scale at  interna~ional  level;  and  they  may  also be  used 
for  non-tariff-protection  purposes. 
Finally,  the  easing  and  simplification of  rules  and  regulations, 
though  often  the  responsibility of  the  ad~inistrative authorities, 
may  be  used  as  an  instrument  which  could  help  to  improve,  as  much 
as  or more  than  other  measures,  the  conditions  under  which  firms 
have  to operate  and  the  efficiency of· intervention measures.· 
This  was  recently  shown  to. be  the  case  in  France  (1)  and  is at 
b  .  .  d  .  h  U  .  d  K.  d  (2)  present  e1ng  tr1e  1n  t  e  n1te  1ng  om. 
(1)  See  above,  remarks  on  the  changing  pattern  of  national  inter-
vention. 
(2)  Facilities offered  in  "enterprise zones". 
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CHAPTER  IV  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  COMMUNITY 
IV.1.  The  existence of  the  Community  may  in  itself  contribute  to 
more  positive adjustment  of  the  economies  of  the  Member  States  to 
internal  and  external  pressures. 
The  Treaties  Lay  down  in  respect  of  economic  activity in  the 
Community  a  number  of  rules  designed  to ensure  the  establishment 
and  proper  functioning  of  a  single market  as  well  as  a  measure  of 
common  protection vis-a-vis  the  rest  of the  world.  These  rules 
are  based  on  an  economic  and  political approach  which  is  rather 
Liberal  in  the  sense  that  a  major  role  is  Left  to market  forces. 
The  present  economic  conditions  are  different  from  those  prevail-
ing  when  the  Treaties  were  drafted,  but,  because of  its dependence 
on  the outside  world  for  supplies of  energy  and  raw  materials  and 
its need  to take  part  in  world  trade,  the  Community  still needs 
to  become  more  competitive.  For  this, it is essential  to exploit 
the  economies  of  scale afforded  by  a  single  market  if the  Commu-
nity is  to  enjoy  the  same  advantages  as  those  avail~ble to  its 
main  trading partners. 
Although  all  the  Community  policies  may  affect  adjustment,  some 
are  particularly  important. 
IV.  Trade  policy 
The  fact  that  more  than  46%  of  Community  exports are directed out-
side the  EEC  means  that  the  process  of  adapting  economic  structures 
must  be  carried out  in  such  a  way  as  to  preserve  the openness  of 
markets. 
This  is  the  reason  why  the  Community's  trade  policy  has  made  the 
Community  one  of  the  areas  most  open  to trade  in  industrial pro-
ducts. 
51 In  this  context,  the  Community's  powers  under  the  Treaty  in  the 
field of  external  trade  confer  upon  it a  key  role  in  the  adjust-
ment  process.  While  Community  measures  in  this field  may  be 
quite  varied  (bilateral, multilateral, unilateral or differenti-
ated  according  to  products or  trading partners  in  question)  and 
may  not  necessarily be  tailored to  the  needs  of  positive adjust-
ment,  they differ  from  national  measures  in  two  respects: 
(i)  a  greater degree  of  transparency due  to  the  institutional 
constraints  under  which  they  are  formulated; 
(ii)  a  balanced  content  resulting  from  the  need  to  reconcile 
the  sometimes  diverse  interests of  the  Member  States. 
In  the  particular  case  of textiles,  the  Community  has  exercised 
its powers  (within  the  framework  of  the  GATT  agreements)  in  an 
industry where  there  is a  most  urgent  need  for  restructuring as 
a  result of  international  competition.  However,  the  ensuing 
restrictions on  trade  have,  as  a  rule,  affected the  rate at  which 
low-wage  countries  have  been  able  to  increase their  share of  the 
Community  market  with  a  yiew  to  reducing  the  destabilizing 
effects on  production  and  employment.  Provided that  the  protec-
tion  is  temporary  and  Lasts  only  as  long  as  necessary  for  in-
ternal  restruction  and  conversion,  the  principle of  progress 
in  the  international division of  labour  will  not  have  been 
undermined. 
However,  as  with  other  examples  of  external  protectiori  mechanis~s~ 
there  is  a  risk  here  that,  under  the  pressure of  vested  interests, 
protection  deemed  necessary  as  a  temporary  measure  may  become 
permanent  and  thereby  result  not  in  a  switch of  emphasis  to 
branches  and/or  products  enjoying  a  comparative  advantage,  but 
in  an  indiscriminate expansion  of  the  industry concerned.  There 
is  also  a  danger  that,  as  more  and  increasingly varied  safeguard 
clauses  are  introduced,  transparency  will  suffer  and  there  will 
be  less  incentive  to  become  more  competitive. 
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IV.3.  The  single  market 
Since  the  establishment  of  a  single  market  is  one  of  the  funda~ 
mental  object~ves  Laid  down  in  the  Treaty,  the  Community  h~s  be~n 
particularly active  in  monitoring  State  intervention  w~ich  c~uld 
affect  intra-Community  trade,  such  as  different  aids  to  reduce 
firms'  costs,  regulatory activities  and  public  procurement. 
The  speed  and  impact  of  action  taken at  Community  Level  in  the 
various  fields  depend  partly on  the  institutional  instrument~ 
available.  The  growing  economic  difficulties  sometimes  give  rise 
to  a  half-hearted attitude  regarding  any  moves  to  expand  the 
scope  of  Community  rules  and  regulations. 
Harmonization  measures  are  subject  t~ very  Long  lead-times  due 
either to  persisting protectionist attitudes  and  administrative 
inertia or  to  the  necessity,  in  order to secure  unanimity,  of 
taking  concurrent  action  in  several  fields  so  as  to  maintain  some 
balance  as  between  Member  States  in  the  costs  and  benefits  of 
harmonization  operations.·  Community;.action  is not  made  any  easier 
by  the  present  proliferation of  national  measures  i~ this  ~rea. 
A recent  judgement  of  the  Court  of  Justice  is particularly inter-
esting  in  this  connection  ("Cassis  de  Di.jon").  The  Court  held 
that  the existence of national  rules  governing  the  characteristics 
of  any  product  could  not  hinder  the  sale of  products  manufactured 
in  other  member  countries,as  Long  as  these  satisfied the  rules 
applicable  in  the  exporting  country.  The  onl~ exceptions  to 
this principle  would  be  rules  concerning  public  health,  protection 
of  consumers  or  of  the  environment,  or fairness  of  commercial 
transactions.  In  future,  therefore,  the  Com~~ssion's harmoniz-
ation measures  will  concentrate on  this  type  of  rule. 
53 In  the  case of  public  procurement,  a  genuine  unification of  the 
Community  market  conflicts  with  the  tendency  to  use  this  instru-
ment  at  national  Level  as  a  means  of  supporting or  promoting 
particular  industries;  the  opening  up  of  public  contracts  for 
the  Community  as  a  whole  is  provided  for  in  a  directive of  July 
1971  as  regards  tenders  for  works  and  in  a  directive of  December. 
1976  as  regards  tenders  for  supplies.  Nevertheless,  these direc-
tives  have  not  yet  been  fully  implemented,  particularly since, 
under  the  second  directive mentioned,  firms  in  certain  branches 
(transport,  production  and  distribution of  water  and  energy, 
telecommunications)  are  exempt  from  the  reqyirement  to  open  up 
public  contracts  for  the  purchase  of  supplies.  The  importance 
of  public  procurement  at  national  level  has  already  been  stressed: 
the  need  to  include this  instrument  in  the  range  of  measures  that 
can  be  taken  to  encourage  advanced-technology  industries  in  the 
Community  should  also  be  emphasized. 
As  regards  the  monitoring of  State aids,  some  progress  has  been 
made  inter alia by  establishing principles  for  the  coordination 
of  regional  aids  and  by  laying  down  principles  for  the  use  of 
sectoral aids. 
Measures  have  been  taken to  devise  a  general  framework  for  aids 
to  the  most  threatened  sectors  (steel,  shipbuilding,  textiles>; 
aids  granted to these  sectors  should  be  linked  to  restructuring 
commitments,  be  diminishing  and  limited  in  their  duration~ 
As  well  as  regional  and  sectoral  aids,  there  are  also general 
"horizontal" aids,  which  have  been  used  increasingly  in  recent 
years  in  order  both  to  promote  investment  in  general  and  to en-
courage  behaviour  (e.g.  in  th~ areai of  R & D and  energy-saving) 
considered desirable  in all sectors  and  regions.  This  raises  new 
problems  as  regards  Commu~~ty rules  and  regulations  on  aid  since 
the  requirements  of  adjustment  must  be  reconciled  with  the  need 
to  avert  distortions of  competition. 
54 7..n. tk  Ut.du-d~ 
-!.~,~ 
a.t.~ 
te..-.t ... 
•••  i-d  e.dd~ 
'f-ey.,  de.~d .u,_ 
rU#(,~  ..• 
IV.4.  Industrial  policy 
While  the  Community's  role  in  the  "orderly"  development  of  inter-
national  trade  and  the  preservation of  the  single  Community  mar-. 
ket  is  indisputable  in  view  of  the  Community's  own  specific  powers 
and  of the  present  degree  of openess  of  the  European  economies, 
the  possibility of  a  more  "active"  adjustment  policy,  especially 
for  industry,  raises  a  number  of  problems. 
In  this  respect,  the  EEC  Treaty applies  to all industries ~xcept 
those  covered  by  either the  ~esc Treaty or the  Euratom  Treaty.  , 
Thus,  in  the  case of  steel,  the  Commission  hal access .to  a  range 
of  instruments  that  have  enabled  it to  pursue  an  active  industrial 
policy  in  this sector. 
The  instruments  available  for  action  in  the  other  sectors,  however, 
are  intended mainly  to  preserve  the  conditions of  competition  in 
the  Community  and  could  play only a _partial  role  in  an  active 
industrial  policy. 
There  is  some  opportunity  for  direct action through  the  b~dget 
(Social  Fund  and  Regional  Fund,  Research  and  Energy  Sub~idies), 
and  in  the  form  of  financial  aid  (EIB  and  NCI).  These  tools  have· 
their  own  rationale,  but  they  can  be  adapted  so  as  to  facilitate 
adjustment. 
The  Community's  role  as  regards  bot~ regulatory activity and 
financial  intervention should  not  be  confined  to sectors  in 
difficulty,  but  should  extend  to other areas. 
In  the  case of  restructuring operations,  the  decisions  to  be  taken 
raise  the  problem  of  how  to  allocate the  costs  of  restructuring· 
(loss  of  capacity or  jobs)  since,  if  Community  industry is to 
remain  competitive  in  the  long  term,  sectors must  be  restructured 
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a  solution  along  these  Lines  must  be  accompanied  by  suitable 
compensation  arrangements. 
It  should  also  be·  rememb~red that,  even  in  traditional  sectors, 
there  are  branches  of  activity or  products  which  could  become 
competitive  once  again  if new  technologies  were  incorporated  into 
their production  processes • 
Promotion  of  certain activities might  be  of  particular  interest 
to  the  Community  because  of  their  high  value-added,  technological 
or  skilled-Labour  content;'  in this  respect,  there  are  some  areas 
where  Community-Level  coordination  could  obviate duplication of 
effort  and  resource  mismanagement.  Similarly,  the  advantages  to 
be  gained  from  a  single  market  comparable  to  those  of our  main 
industrialized partners  could  be  realized. 
This  objective  should  be  pursued  more  systematically by  taking 
measures  that  help  to  reduce  the  risk  to  a  tolerable  Level,  by 
pooling  financial  efforts,  by  bringing  research  teams  together, 
by  coordinating  programmes,  by  exploiting  economies  of  scale at 
the  production  stage  and  by  expanding  the  market  (particularly 
as  regards  public  procurement  policies  and  collaboration  between 
potential  users  and  producers).  The  Commission  has  recently 
taken  action  along  these  lines, notably  in  the  field of  micro-
electronics. 
(1)  An  additional  problem  is that  in  restructuring account  has 
to  be  taken  not  only of  existing  capacities  but  also of 
expansion  programmes  already decided  upon.  Further,  in 
some  cases,  greater  competitiveness  will  depend  on  new 
investments  aimed  at  increasing  the  output  of  certain units, 
and  this makes  the  problem  of  marginal  plants  a  permanent 
one. 
56 Owing  to  present  budgetary  constraints,  Community  financial  in-
tervention  will  have  to  be  concentrated,  rather  than  spread over 
a  large  number  of  ventures.  Moreover,  as  long  as  the  results 
are  made  fully available  to all  the  Member  States, projects 
financed  need  not  necessarily  concern all  the  Member  States, 
provided  they  have  a  genuine  Community  dimension.  However, 
promoting  cooperation  could  be  done  in  many  fields;  so  that, 
with  a  sufficient  number  of projects,  the  comparative  advantages 
·available  in  the  different  countries  can  be  exploited. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The  following  are  the  main  conclusions to be  drawn  from  the  anal~ 
yses  and  remarks  set  out  above: 
1 •  The  structural  adjustment  process  is closely dependent  upon 
macroeconomic  trends  and  policies: 
Structural  intervention  measures,  whether  general  or speci-
fic,  may  back  up  and  supplement  macroeconomic  policies 
(notably  by  removing  the  obstacles  to  stronger  growth), 
but  they  cannot  take  their place. 
In  the  present  conte~t, persistent  inflation, the  balance 
of  payments  situation and  public  deficits  severely  r~strict 
the  Community's  and  the  Member  States'  scope  for  pursuing 
a  macroeconomic  policy of  supporting overall  demand  and 
priority should therefore  n6  doubt  be  given  to  easing  the 
energy  constraint  and  to  strengthening  the  productive  and 
marketing  base  of  firms  so  as  to obtain stronger  growth. 
It would,  however,  be  dangerous  to  rely solely on  a  spon-
taneous  upturn  in  domestic  and  external  demand  resulting 
from  such  improved  supply-side  conditions.  A gradual  in-
crease  in  the  economic  scope  for  supporting  demand  there-
fore  becomes  a  matter of priority for  the  purpose of  ad-
justment. 
2.  Horizontal  policies  (such  as  exchange  rate  policy,  taxation, 
parafiscal  policy, etc.)  are  not  neutral  in  their effect  on  the 
adjustment  process.  It  is therefore  essential  to  pay  special 
attention  to  the  constraints  which  they  impose  on  structural poli-
cies  in  other areas.  This  is particularly true of,  for  example, 
exchange  rate policy  and  the  arrangements  for  financing  the  social 
security system. 
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3.  State  intervention  in  the  adjustment  process  has  often  re-
sulted  in  the  proliferation .of  instruments:  despite  recent 
efforts  aimed  at  coordination  and  rationalization,  the  number 
of  instruments  used  has  increased further,  with  a  view  to alle-
viating  the  most  immediate  employment  problems  or  in  response  to 
"strategic"  considerations.  These  instruments  have  often been 
designed  or  applied  in  such  a  way  as·to produce  adjustment.which 
is negative  rather  than  positive,  specific  rather  than  systematic, 
and  they  have  not  always  been  coordin.ated  with  each  other or  with 
macroeconomic  policy. 
Although  official doctrine  on  intervention  is  increasingly em-
phasizing  the  need  for  positive  adjustment  and  for  greater  res-
pect  of  market  forces,  this  has  n6t  in  practice  ruled out  speti-
fic  interventions  and/or  defensive  measures,  not  only  in the 
declining  industries,  but  also  in  the  "growth"  industries. 
4.  The  demand  for  adjustment  is bound  to  increase over'the 
next  few  years,  not  only  in  the  declining  industries  (steel, 
textiles,  shipbuilding),  but  also  in  the  industries_ which  have 
played  an  essential  role  in.the  growth_of  the.industrialized 
countries  (the  motor  industry)  and  in  the  advanced  technology 
industries  where  the  speed  of  technological  change  also  means 
greater  pressure  for  adjust~ent  (e.g.  telecommunicat~ons, where 
progress  in  innovation  is posing  job  problems,  ~~spite the  growth' 
of  the  ma~ket).  Meanwhile,  there  is a  serious  risk  that  the 
supply of  adjustment  may  fall if high  overall  unemployment  re-
duces  the  willingness of  workers  to apply  new  technologies. 
s.  Excessive  reliance on  negative  adjustments  can  only  lead  to 
a  double  impasse: 
a  budgetary and  financial  impasse,  given firstly the  grow-
ing  budgetary  costs of policies  aimed  at  supporting  indus-
tries  in  decline  and  secondly the  absolute  need  to  limit 
the  public  sector borrowing  requirement  in  all  the  EEC 
countries. 
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a  slowdown  in  productivity growth,  damaging  the  growth 
rate  of  the  economy  and  thereby  creating  a  general  en-
vironment  that  is more  unfavourable  to  the  necessary 
adjustments. 
6.  The  essential  criterion for  adjustment  cannot  be  short-term 
job preservation:  reducing  unemployment,  which  is  a  prime 
objective,  must  be  based  on  the  search  for  structures that  are 
sound  in  the  medium  term  and  on  the  creation of  value  added 
enabling  a  higher  Level  of  growth  to  be  maintained  on  a  Lasting 
basis. 
7.  While  there  is  a  consensus,  at  Least  in  broad  terms,  on 
the  need  to  restore  the  market  to  its proper  role  in  the  adjust-
ment  process,  it is clear  that  the  public  sector  will  continue 
to  play  an  important  part  in  positive adjustment,  insofar  as 
action  is  required  in  areas  such  as  energy,  telecommunications, 
new  transport  techniques,  data-processing  technology,  etc. 
These  are all areas  where  important  externalities  exist  and 
in  which  government  can  therefore naturally play  a  major  role. 
8.  Furthermore,  it is  increasingly. clear that  there are  Limits 
to  the  effectiveness of  a  sectoral  approach: 
first,  the  sectors  embrace  industries  having  different 
potentials  in  terms  of  comparative  advantage,  scope  for 
applying  new  technologies,  and  growth.  Thus,  the  dicho-
tomy  between  negative  interventions  in  declining  sectors 
and  positive  interventions  in  growth  sectors  is  not  al-
ways  pertinent. 
second,  many  areas  of  action  on  which  positive  adjustment 
is  crucially dependent  (energy  conservation,  dissemination 
of  technology,  social  technology,  etc.)  go  beyond  tradi-
tional  sector classifications. 
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9.  In  the  context  of  positive adjustment,  policies on  research 
and  on  investment  in  human  resources  are  bound  to  occupy  a  cen-
tral position: 
as  regards  research,  what  is  needed  generally spe'aking 
is not  so  much  to  increase total  financing  as  to  concen~ 
trate it  in  those  areas  in  which  member  countries  retain 
comparative  advantages  (actual  or potential);  to give 
greater  weight  than  in  the  past  to marketing  criteria 
and  to  the  dissemination  of  research  results;  and  to  link 
efforts  in. this  area  with  other  key  adjustment  instruments 
such  as  public  procurement  policy ~nd the  policy  on  the 
productive tertiary  s~ctor. 
as  regards  investment  in  human  resources,  what  is needed· 
is to  allow  redeployment  of  Labour  shed  by  uncompetitive 
firms  through  appropriate  vocational  training and  to  en~ 
able  firms  and  offices to  exploit  new  technology  (such  as 
information  transmission  and  robotics). 
10.  Over  and  above  the  foregoing  considerations,  positive adjust-
ment  policies  must,  far  more  than  is the  case  today,  meet  three 
essential  conditions: 
transparency as  regards  the  object~ves and  the  resources 
used,  this being  a  necessary  condition  for  the  purpose 
of  assessing  costs  and  effictiveness; 
coordination  so  as  to  take  advantage  of  the  scope  for 
synergy  between  the  various  measures,  since  a  series of 
instruments,  even  if well  devised  from  a  technical  point 
of  view,  do  not  amount  to  a  policy  unless  they  are pro-j 
perly  linked  up  to  serve  an  objective; 
a  check  on  the  results  in  the  form  of  assessment  and  mon-
nitoring,  allowing  the priorities and  instruments  to  be 
readjusted if  necessary~ 
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In  this  connection  the  Community  can  play an  important  role  by 
seeing  that  certain agreed "rules of  the  game"  are  respected. 
11.  The  Community  must  play  a  growing  role  in  the positive ad-
justment  process. 
The  Community's  initial contribution  to  adjustment  must  be  to 
ensure,  at  macroeconomic  Level  and  in  the  context  of  the  Euro-
pean  Monetary  System,  a  more  stable environment  by  coordinating 
short  and  medium-term  policies at  the  highest  growth  rates  that 
are  consistent  with  the  fight  against  inflation. 
As  regards  structural policies, its  role  cannot  be  confined either 
to  the traditional  areas  in  which  it has  been  active hitherto 
(external  relations,  the  single market,  etc.>  or to  industries 
in difficulties  such  as  steel or textiles.  It  must  also  be  ex-
tended  to  the  areas  or  industries  in  which  it  can  provide  a  con-
sistent  framework  and  reduce  the  dangers  and  waste  which  would 
be  inherent  in  a.series of  independent  initiatives. 
This  is  particularly the  case  with  regard  to  certain general 
measures  which  involve  Community  priorities  (energy  conservation 
and  the  development  of  new  sources of  energy,  research  and  the 
spread of  new  techniques,  environmental  protection,  etc.)  and 
the  development  of  certain  advanced  technology  industries  and 
industries  having  high  value  added. 
Accordingly,  with  a  view  to  adjustment,  the  Community  must  re-
inforce  and  adapt  the  instruments  at  its disposal  (regulatio~s, 
competition  policy,  financial  assistance, etc.)  in  order to  make 
the  most  of  the  comparative  advantage  enjoyed  by  the  Member 
States, to exploit  the  areas  where  they ·complement  each other 
and  to  compensate  for  disadvantages  where  they exist. 
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REGULAR  G R A D E  P  E T  R 0  L 
1975  98  95  93  93  90  91  96  92  94  91  104  109  116  131 
1976  98  91  93  92  100  100  92  87  90  84  96  97  119  142 
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1978  91  87  100  114  95  102  84  81  86  87  79  80  104  121 
1979  95  85  105  122  89  94  88  80  93  87  95  86  108  110 
1980  104  84  108  111  94  90  99  84  107  91  99  89  120  119 
A U T 0  M 0  T  I  V E  D I  E S  E L  0  I  L 
1975  95  94  94  93  90  85  97  91  101  95  88  79  90  82 
1976  93  91  95  88  83  69  88  84  90  87  85  81  80  75 
1977  89  87  97  90  70  42  84  79  85  81  92  89  88  S'8 
1978  87  .  86  97  98  65  38  87  95  80  80  87  85  81  64 
1979  93  85  109  114  73  37  102  105  98  100  99  92  89  60 
1980  102  84  .  118  106  88  38  122  109  115  85  102  93  104  81 
DOMESTIC  i1  E A T  I  N G  0  I  L 
1975  95  97  94  94  90  90  103  133  110  70  72  81  84  -
1976  83  85  101  96  96  96  91  11.4  97  63  92  70  97  90 
1977  80  82  105  99  108  178  89  110  87  58  101  127  107  88 
1978  77  100  104  13~  104  178  89  178  83  56  94  140  95  81 
1979  128  148  121  184  119  187  116  235  115  62  109  141  115  72 
1980  160  264  150'  198  153  218  153  283  147  68  118  135  133  160 
H E A V Y  F U E L  0  I  L ** 
1975  85  94  96  90  112  85  91  90  76  45  75  81  95  -
1976  96  90  93  82  112  72  93  82  76  45  78  70  104  120 
1977  99  87  99  241  119  71  100  27  71  43  86  126  119  122 
1978  89  85  94  223  101  68  85  75  60  14  74  139  105  113 
1979  109  81  113  202  126  59  96  72  67  13  84  138  121  100 
1980  135  77  137  178  154  49  135  67  97  12  95  134  133  222 
*  Provisional  figures  calculated  from  monthly  data  converted  into  annual  averages  and  deflated  using  the 
consumer  price  index.  For  1980  :  prices  and  taxes  for  first  six  months  of  thP  year. 
**  For  heavy  fuel  oilr only excise duties  are  includedr  since  VAT  is considered deductible. 
Denmark 
Price  Taxes 
in.tx) 
93  92 
95  "96 
92  106 
88  105 
100  117 
116  124 
97  77 
94  88 
92  105 
88  131 
122  217 
154  264 
95  76 
98  88 
91  107 
89  136 
132  237 
171  308 
79  68 
82  . 79 
73  33 
69  68 
86  129 
124  180 
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1-< 1970 
1)  Gross  wages  and 
salaries paid  100 
1a  Wages  and  salaries  net  of 
all  social  contributions  100 
1b • .'~mployees  1 social  contri-
but ions  100 
2l  Employers'  total 
social  contributions  100 
3>  Err.ptoyc:>rs'total  social 
contributions  as  7.  of  gross 
·.~age-s  and  salar"ies 
paid  17,9 
EVOLUTION  Or  GROSS  AND  NET  WAGe>  AND 
SALA•R IES  MID  Of  SOCIAL  CNITRIBUTIONS 
GERr•lANY 
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 
138,2  151 ,3  156,5  166,6  178,6  189,8 
137,0  150,0  153,6  162,2  173,5  184,4 
149,5  164,0  180,2  203,5  220,3  234,9 
156,0  176,6  189,0  210,7  223,2  236,7 
20,2  20,9  21,6  22,7  22,4  22,4 
TABLE  III 
FRANCE 
1970  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
100  145,9  173,7  201,5  231 '7  t60,  1 
100  144,8  172,2  198,6  .226,5  252,3 
100  159,8  192,4  238,0  ~96,  1  356,6 
100  146,1  175,3  215,7  a54,4  293,4 
31,9  . 31,9  32,1  34,1  :35,0  35,9 
. == =  == =  =  === =  =  =  == =  === === == == =  == =  ==== == =  -=  == =  === == =  =  =  =  =  =  == =  =-=  =  ====-=  =  =  =  == --=  == =  ===i===== =--= =  ===--===== =-==== =--.  === ==-== === 
U~ITED  KHIGDo;~  NETHERLANDS 
1  ~  Gross  wages  and 
salaries  paid  100  140,7  169,6  218,1  228,1  290,7  310,3  100  144,4  166,5  187,6  ,297 ,6  227'  1 
1a. Wages  and  salaries net  of 
all social  contributions  100  140,1  168,9  217,5  244,7  270,0  308,7  100  124,3  142,4  160,2  176,7  194,1 
1b. Employee-s 'soci.al  contri-
but ions  100  150,8  179,7  228,0  274,9  310,8  335,1  100  139,5  165,6  187,4  210,8  226,2 
2l  Employers'  total 
social  contributions  100  158,2  205,3  284,3  363,2  386,7  432,1  100  166,4  197,7  223,6  251,9  270,2 
3)  Emp'Loyers 'total  sac i a l 
contr11:::utions  as  r.  of 
gra'ss  ~.:.3ges  and  sa La:-
r~es oaid.  11,5  12,9  13,9  15,0  18,3  .15,3  16,0  23,9  27,6  28,4  28,5  29,0  28,4 
1978 
292,1 
283,6 
398,7 
334,3. 
36,5 
244,3 
207,2 
251,3 
292,6 
28,6 
=== =  =  === ====== ====== === ===== =  =  ===== ====== ===-==== =-======-======· === === --=======  =  ======= === ==  ======== ====--=  === ==-== ===--=====-
ITALY  BEL.Gl:.;:~ 
1)  Gross  \\~ages  and 
salaries paid  100  156,0  192,0  231,3  279,8  355,3  412,7  100  148,7  179,5  204,7  234,3  255,4  275,4 
2J  Employe-rs'total 
social  contributions  100  151,8  193,0  238,0  297'  1  331,8  378,4  100  157,0  185,6  222,9  254,0  278,8  296,0 
3)  Employers 1  total  social 
contributions as  X of 
gross  "':ages  and  sala-
ries paid.  38,5  37,5  38,7  39,6  40,9  35,9  35,3  23,7  25,1  24,6  25,9  '25,  7  25,9  25,5 
Source  :  EUROSTAT  - National  Accounts  ESA 
.*  1a  and  1b  nat  avaHabte  for  Italy  and  Belgium 6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
Trend  in  R & D government  finanting  (1970-78)  as· a  percentage of 
TOTAL  BUDGET 
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Source  EUROSTAT,  Government  financing  of  research  and  developm-ent  1970-1979 Breakdown  of  R & D government  financing  by  objectives 
D  F  I  NL 
Objectives  %  %  %  % 
7G  7G  78  72  76  78  70  76  78  70  76  78 
Human  and  social  objectives  6,1  11,0  13,4  9,9  11,5  11,4  6,6  6,2  11,5  11,8  19,7  19,7 
Technological  objectives  24,9  24,1  27,5  32,3  29,0  26,4  44,8  41,4  39,8  17,0  13,2  13,8 
of  which  : 
- exploration & exploitation of 
the earth  and  its  atmosphere  1,7  1,8  2,2  2,5  3,2  3,1  1,5  1,6  2,6  1,3  1,0  0,7 
- production,  distribution 
and  rational  utilisation 
of  energy  11,3  11,0  13,~  8,3  8,5  7,9  21,7  20,7  19,0  6,2  4,7  4,5 
- industrial  productivity 
and  technology  6,6  6,8  7,3  15,2  11,8  10,4  17,1  10,3  8,3  6,4  4,8  5,0 
- exploration and  exploitation 
of  space  5,3  4,5  4,2  6,3  5,5  5,0  4,5  8,8  9,9  3,1  2,7  3,6 
Agriculture  2,1  2,0  2,0  3,0  4,3  3,9  3,2  3,1  5,0  8,7  7,4  7,4 
Defence  17,7  11,4  12,2  31,8  29,5  33,3  3,9  4,5  4,3  4,9  3,2  3,1 
General  promotion of·· 
knowledge  49,2  51,5  44,7  22,7  25,3  - 24,5  41,6  44,5  39,3  54,0  54,3  55,6 
Expenditure  not  i-temized  - - 0,2  0,3  0,4  0,5  - 0,1  0,3  0~1  0,6  2,2  0,4 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
--·--- L___ 
Source  Government  Financing  of  Research  and  Development  in  the  Community  countries,  European  Communities,  CREST/51/78 
-s 
% 
70  76  78 
13,7  16,1  28,8 
30,2  35,2  23,2 
3,4  2,8  2,2 
13,0  16,9  7,8 
9,9  10,5  10,2 
3,9  5,0  3,0 
4,2  5,3  3,7 
0,4  0,6  0,2 
51,4  42,8  44,1 
0,1  - -
100  100  100 
--~---
UK 
% 
70  76 
5,0  6,8 
25,4  17,9 
0,3  0,8 
7,2  7,7 
16,0  7,1 
1,9  2,3 
2,6  4,3 
41,0  47,7 
25,6  23,4 
0,4  - a, 1 
100  100 
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< TYPES  OF  INDUSTRIAL  R & D SUPPORTING  SCHEMES  IN  THE  MEM-BER  STATES  (1) 
Patents  11.  Li- Advisory  act  1St  Collective  Support  for  sele- Support  regara- Equity  capi 
censing  systems  techn.  systems  research  cted technologies  Less  of  sector  ·taL 
Belgium  :XXX  xxxx  XX  XXX  XX 
.  •. 
Denmark  XXX  xxxxxx  XXX  X  XXX  X 
Germany  I  xxx:x  XXX XXX  XXX XXX  xxxxxx  XX  XX 
I 
I 
France- XXX  XXX  XX  X{2)  xxxxxxxx  X 
Italy  X  XXX  X(l)  xxxx  X 
Ireland  I 
XXX  xxxx  X  X  XXX  X 
Netherlands  XX  XXX  - XXX  XX  XX  X 
United  Kingdom  XX  ·  ___ _  l  ~ 
XX  xxxxxx  -X.\XXXXX  X 
--
(1)  Only  the  number  of  schemes  is  indicated and  not  their  importance  or  financial  contribution to  the  industrial  R&D 
(2)  The  French  Large-scale Technological  Programmes  are  composed  of  7  separate projects  (see  Annex  I.  p.  199) 
(3)  Under  the  Italian "Projetti  Finalizzati"  CNR.  There  are  now  24  approved  projects. 
Source  :  J.M.  DIDIER  AND  ASSOCIATES  "Direct  and  indirect  measures  for  promoting  industrial  research  and  development 
in the  member  states  of  the  European  Communities". 
Report  prepared  for  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,Directorate General  for  Research, 
Science  and  Education  - Dec.  1979. 
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EXAMPLES  OF  NATIONAL  INTERVENTION  MEASURES 
This  annex  describes  in brief  a  number  of  intervention measures  taken  in  the 
Member  States.  This  List,  which  does  not  claim to  be  exhaustive,  classifies 
intervention  measures  according  to  whether  they  are  concerned  with  firms• 
inputs  (capital,  Labour)  or  technology  and  organizational  methods, or with the 
markets  on  which  firms  sell their products.  (It  includes  sdme  measures  ~hich 
have  been  discontinued recently,  and  where  this  is thecase, it is stated). 
CAPITAL 
(i)  TAX  INCENTIVES 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Belgium 
MEASURES  ON  INPUTS 
SINCE  1977,  CHANGES  IN  COMPANY  TAXATION,  including 
the possibility of  setting off  Losses  against  previous 
profits,  reduction of  the  tax  on  companies  trading 
capital,  changes  in the  rules. on  accelerated  deprecia-
tion,  and  abolition of  double  taxation of  dividends. 
GENERAL  SCHEME  TO  PROMOTE  INVESTMENT.  Since  April 
1979,  allowance  against  (taxable)  capital  gains  resulting 
from  balance-sheet  revaluation equal  to  up  to  10  % of 
investment  made  between  1979  and  1980.  Measures  appli-
cable  as  of  1  October  1980  for  a  five-year  period allow 
companies  to  deduct  from  taxable profits  an  amount  equal 
to  10%  of  the  sums  devoted to  the  acquisition of  new_ 
plant  and  machinery.  · 
For  the period  1976-78,  REVALUATION  OF  CERTAIN  ASSETS 
WAS  ALLOWED.  For  tax purposes,  valuation at  replacement 
cost  for  some  depreciabl~ assets. 
TAX  CONCESSIONS  :  tax  allowance  in  respect  of  the 
investment  of  capital gains  resulting  from  balance-sheet 
revaluation  ;  rules  on  degressive  depreciation  extended 
to all plants  and  machinery  ("Plan de  relance  de  l'acti-
vite economique  et  de  L  •emploi",  February  1977),  mer~sures 
contemplated  for  the period  1977~1980. (ii)  FINANCIAL  INCENTIVES 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United  Kingdom 
Belgium 
1975  :  INVESTMENT  GRANT  of  7.5%  made  available 
in part  by  the  Lander. 
1975  :  SUBSIDIES  of  7.5  % for  energy-saving 
investments. 
1979  :  EQUITY  LOANS  granted out  of  the  resources 
of  the  Economic  and  Social  Development  Fund,  with 
repayment  terms  varying  according  to the  success 
of  the  investment  project  ;  those  administered 
by  the  Special  Industrial  Adaptation  Fund  are 
designed to promote  both  regional  development  and 
industrial  conversion. 
REGIONAL  DEVELOPMENT  GRANTS  related 
subject  to  a  ceiling  expressed  as  a 
ment.  Strong  regional  selectivity. 
obtaining grants  are published,  but 
made  automatically. 
to  job  creation, 
% of  the  invest-
Conditions  for 
grants  are  not 
SEPTEMBER  1978  :  LOANS  ON  PREFERENTIAL  TERMS  for 
job-creating  investments. 
These  three  measures  were  reinforced  in  April  1979. 
The  intention is  to  extend  them  for  1981. 
CAPITAL  GRANTS  (Law  183/1976)  for  investment 
schemes  in  the  Mezzogiorno. 
INTEREST-RATE  SUBSIDIES  (DPR  902/1976)  related  to 
investment  size  and  regional  Location. 
RESTRUCTURING  AND  CONVERSION  FUND  (Law  675/77) 
interest  subsidies,  Loans  at preferential  rates, 
and  grants  available  for  the  period  1977-1981. 
1979  :  REGIONAL  DEVELOPMENT  GRANTS  :  changes  in  the 
conditions  for  awarding  these grants  with  a  view  to 
a  greater degree  of  regional  selectivity.  Grants 
are  automatic,  once  the  qualifying  criteria are  met. 
SELECTIVE  ASSISTANCE  FOR  INVESTMENT  PROJECTS  under 
Section 8  of the  Industry Act  1972  ;  discretionary 
measure  to  promote  projects that  are  in  the  "na-
tional  interest".  No  framework  for  granting  this 
assistance  exists  as  yet. 
1977  :  INTEREST-RATE  SUBSIDIES  initially granted 
under  the  1975  Economic  Assitance  Programme  and 
improved  under  the  Expansion  Law  of  1977. 
2 LABOUR 
(i)  EMPLOYMENT  SUBSIDIES 
(ii)  VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING 
Germany 
France 
United 
Kingdom 
Germany 
APRIL  1979:  PREMIUM  FOR  RECRUITING  DISABLED  WORKERS: 
DM  8  000  to  DM  18  000  for  each  new  job  created 
for  at  Least  18  months;  in  force  until  31  March  1980. 
APRIL  1979:  PREMIUM  TO  ENCOURAGE  THE  EMPLOYMENT 
OF  OLDER  MANAGERIAL  STAFF:  FF  18  000  to  FF  24  000 
for  each  new  job  created.  Applicable  until 
December  1981. 
1976-78:  TEMPORARY  EMPLOYMENT  SUBSIDY:  1  10  per 
week  for  every  threatened  job  for  a  period of  three 
months,  with  the  possibility of  an  extension,  for 
firms  obliged  to  dismiss at  Least  50  people.  This 
measure  was  discontinued  in  APRIL  1979. 
1978-79:  SMALL  FIRMS  EMPLOYMENT  SUBSIDY:  l  20  per 
week  fo~ three months  for  each  additional  worker 
taken  on  by  firms  with  Less  than  200  employees; 
in October  1978,  subsidy  extended  to  the  country 
as  a  whole  but  once  again  restricted to  certain 
regions  from  July 1979  onwards. 
JULY  1978:  ADULT  EMPLOYMENT  SUBSIDY,  restricted ·to 
particular  regions;  £  20  per  we~k for  each  person 
who  has  been  unemployed  for  12  months  or  more  and 
who  is taken  on  by  a  firm  on  a  full-time  basis. 
MAY  1979:  SPECIAL  REGIONAL  PROGRAMME  RELATING  TO 
LABOUR  MARKET  POLICY:  Federal  intervention  confined 
to  regions  where  unemployment  ih  1978  was  higher 
than  6%  of  the  regional  labour  force.  The  programme 
includes  incentives  for  vocational  retraining of. 
employees  in  firms  where  restructuring  is  under  way 
and  for  redeployment  of  unskilled,  Long-term 
unemployed  persons.  Expected  budgetary  cost: 
DM  500  million per  year. 
AUGUST  1979:  CHANGES  IN  THE  RULES  ON  THE  DIFFERENT 
SUBSIDIES  AVAILABLE  FOR  FURTHER  VOCATIONAL  TRAINING: 
increased  subsidies  for  persons  following  further 
vocational  training  courses •. 
J France 
Italy 
United 
Kingdom 
Belgium 
JULY  1977:  GOVERNMENT  ASSISTANCE  FOR  FIRMS  EMPLOYING 
TRAINIEES.  Scheme  renewed  annually  since  then  under 
successive  "national  employment  pacts".  Wages  equal 
to  between  76%  and  90%  of  minimum  wage)  are  paid  to 
young trainees (especially those  undergoing  practical 
training  in  firms)~  Scheme  ~lanned to  continue until 
December  1981.  Annual  budgetary  commitments: 
FF  1500  million. 
FEBRUARY  1979:  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  RETRAINING  UNITS 
offering appropriate vocational  retraining  to  workers 
leaving  the  steel  industry. 
JUNE  1977  and  JULY  1978:  LAW  ON  VOCATIONAL  TRAINING  FOR 
YOUNG  PEOPLE.  This  law  provides  for  the public 
financing  of  employment-training  contracts  for 
young  people. 
VOCATIONAL  TRAINING  AND  RETRAINING  PROGRAMMES  IN  PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISES:  Programmes  for  adult  workers  only, 
notably  in  connection  with  the  conversion  plans  of 
public  enterprises  in  industry~. 
APRIL  1978:  YOUTH  OPPORTUNITIES·  PROGRAMME:  under  the 
programme,  the  State meets  the·cost  of  training 
courses  in  f1rms  that  last  no  ~ore than  12  months 
and  are  intended  for  persons  under  19  who  have  been 
out  of  work  for  more  than  six  weeks  in  1980-81. 
1977-78:  REFORM  OF  VOCATIONAL  TRAINING:  Industrial 
Training Boards  were  set  up  to  improve  the  quality 
of  vocational  training,  to  adapt  it to  needs  and  to 
spread  the  costs  over  industry  dnd  commerce. 
1978:  TRAINING  OPPORTUNITIES  SCHEME:  public  finance 
for  accelerated  training for  a  wide  variety of  skilled 
jobs  for  people  out  of  work  or  wishing  to  change  jobs 
(since  July  1979,  no  training provided  for  tertiary-
sector  jobs). 
JUNE  AND  NOVEMBER  1977:  REFORM  OF  VOCATIONAL  TRAINING, 
concerning  in particular the  system  of  "credit  hours" 
for  workers  following  vocational  training  courses, 
financing  by  the  government,cif  SO%  of  vocational 
training  expenses,  an  increase  in  the  guaranteed 
wage  during  training  leave  and  a  review  of  the  way 
in  which  training  courses  are  organised. 
4 (iii)  REDUCTION  IN 
SOCIAL  SECURITY 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
France  JULY  1977:  PARTIAL  EXEMPTION  IN  RESPECT  OF  EMPLOYERS' 
SOCIAL  SECURITY  CONTRIBUTIONS:  50%  reduction, 
applicable until  December  1981,  in  employers' 
social  security contribution  for  firms  taking on 
a  net  increase  in  the  workforce.  This  measure,  agreed 
under  the"national  employment  pacts"  represents  an 
annual  budgetary  cost  of  FF  675  million. 
JULY  1977:  EXEMPTION  FOR  EMPLOYERS'  SOCIAL  SECURITY 
CONTRIBUTIONS  PAID  IN  RESPECT  OF  APPRENTICES: 
in  the  case  of  apprenticeships  in the artisanat, 
total  exemption  for  3  years,  reduced  to 1  year  in 
the  case of  apprenticeships  in  industry.  This  measure, 
agreed  under  the  "national  employment  pacts", 
represents  an  annual  budgetary  cost  put  at  about 
FF  460  million. 
Italy  JUNE  1977:  SCHEME  UNDER  WHICH  THE  GOVERNMENT  HELPS 
WITH  THE  BURDEN  OF  FIRMS'  SOCIAL  SECURITY  CONTRIBUTIONS: 
initially introduced  for  the period  from  February  1977 
to  January  1978  and  subsequently  extended  in 
different  forms. 
Belgium  JANUARY  1977  AND  MARCH  1979:  REDUCTION  OF  EMPLOYERS' 
SOCIAL  SECURITY  CONTRIBUTIONS  for  firms  with  more 
than  100  employees  which  increase their  workforce 
by  1%  annually  in  the  period  1979-81.  Total 
exemption  until  1981  for  contributions  in  respect 
:iv)  MOBILITY  INCENTIVES 
Italy 
United 
Kingdom 
of  workers  taken  on  during  that  period  and  15% 
reduction  in  contributions  in  respect  of  existing 
workforce. 
1977:  CREATION  OF  A LABOUR  MOBILITY  FUND 
(Law  675/1977):  assistance available  in  various  forms 
to  workers  moving  elsewhere  in order to  take  a  job 
through  a  central  or.regional  "job clearing agency". 
REMOVAL  GRANTS:  an  employee  recruited for  at  least  six 
months  and  expected  to  remain  with  a  firm  for  at  least 
six  months  following  his  move  qualifies  for  a 
contribution of  L 1500  towards  his  removal  expenses. 
The  grants  have  been  reduced  considerably  since July 
1979. 
5 PROMOTION  OF 
RESEARCH  AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
MEASURES  OPERATING  ON  TECHNOLOGY  AND  ORGANIZATIONAL  METHODS 
Since  1979,  PROMOTION  OF  R & D IN  SMALL  AND  MEDIUM-SIZED  FIRMS 
(firms  employing  Less  than  1000  people  and  with  a  turnover 
of  Less  than  DM  150  million  :·direct public  assistance  for 
certain  research  projects,  reimbursement  of· up  to  45%  of 
R & D labour  costs,  tax  relief  for  investments  in  R & D, 
30%  premium  for  R & D contracts  signed  abroad,  subsidized 
loans. 
PROMOTION  OF  R & D IN  CERTAIN  SECTORS  :  to  encourage  the 
introduction  of  new  processes or  equipment  in the field of 
health  services  (grants totalling  DM  29  million  were  made 
to private and  public  research  institutes  in  1979);  to 
foster  the  development  of  new  products  or processes  in 
data  processing  (mainly  software);  to  encourage  wider  use 
of  microelectronics  (notably  in  the  production  processes 
of  small  and  med,ium-sized  firms>;  to as·sist  selected 
pilot  projects  in the  fields  of  office electronics and  data 
transmission. 
JULY  1979:  NEW  MEASURES  TO  PROMOTE  R & D IN  SMALL  AND 
MEDIUM-SIZED  FIRMS  (firms  employing  less  than  2000  people): 
innovation  premiums  of  up  to  20%  of  R & D contracts  signed 
abroad,  with  an  annual  ceiling 'of  FF  1  million; ·loans  to 
cover  50  % of  costs  involved  in  introducing  new  technologies 
and  products;  these  loans  are  repayable  only  if the 
project  is  successful  (loans  available  to all  firms). 
APRIL  1977:  LOCALIZATION  PREMIUM  FOR  CERTAIN  RESEARCH 
ACTIVITIES  in  certain  regions  amounting  to  FF  25  000  for 
each  new  permanent  job  created  in the  case  of  investments 
of  less  than  FF  10  million  (for  investments  over 
FF  10  million  a  ceiling of  25%  is applied).  Available 
until  December  1981. 
JANUARY  1979:  REORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INSTITUTIONS  RESPONSIBLE 
FOR  PROMOTING  INNOVATION:  mainly  reform  and  decentralization 
of  the  "Agence  Nation  ale pour ·La  va Lori sat  ion  de  La 
recherche"  CANVAR>. 
1977:  NEW  RESOURCES  FOR  THE  SPECIAL  FUND  FOR  APPLIED  RESEARCH 
Claw  675/77),  to  be  used  notably  for  particularly. important 
technological  projects  involving a high  industrial  ~isk; 
20%  of  the  Fund's  resources  earmarked  for  research  undertaken 
or dissemination  of  new  ideas  by  small  and  medium-sized 
firms. 
6 United 
Kingdom 
Belgium 
JULY  1977:  PRODUCT  AND  PROCESS  DEVELOPMENT  SCHEME  : 
grants  of  up  to  25%  of  investments  in  the  manufacture 
of  mir.roelectronic  components.  Only  investments  of 
~  25  000  or  more  qualify. 
JULY  1978:  MICROPROCESSOR  APPLICATION  PROJECT:  measures 
aimed  at  fostering  the  application of  microprocessor 
techniques  in  the  production processes of  different 
industries. 
JULY  1978:  MICROELECTRONICS  INDUSTRY  SUPPORT  PROGRAMME: 
5-year assistance programme  for  the development  and 
dissemination  of  new  product  or  processes  by  the  micro-
electronics  industry.  Grants  may  cover  between  25% 
and  50%  of  R &  D costs  and  up  to  25  % of  investments 
necessary  for  production. 
1976-80  RESEARCH  &  DEVELOPMENT  PROGRAMME:  with  special 
emphasis  on  nuclear  technology;  in addition'research. 
grants  for  non-nuclear  industrial  technology  (e.g. 
projects  involving  several  sectors  in  the  fields  of 
energy  saving,  raw-material  conservation, etc.). 
7 MEASURES  TO  ASSIST 
SMALL  AND  MEDIUM-
SIZED  FIRMS 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United 
Kingdom 
Belgium 
FEBRUARY  1979:  START-UP  LOANS  FOR  SMALL  AND  MEDIUM-SIZED 
FIRMS:  Loans  of  DM  100  000  available to businessmen 
setting-up  firms;  these  Loans  have  a  10-year period 
of  grace  and  carry no  intere·st  during  the first .two 
years. 
JULY  1980:  CREATION  OF  THE  "CREDIT  D'EQUIPEMENT  DES 
PME".  This  new  agency  is  responsible for  all forms 
of  public  assistance  for  small  and  medium-sized. 
firms. 
MARCH  1979:  CHANGES  IN,  AND  REINFORCEMENT  OF  MEASURES 
TO  ASSIST  SMALL  AND  MEDIUM-SIZED  BUSINESSES: 
concerning  the  conditions  for  providing mutual 
guarantees  for  loans  by  small  businesses  (creation 
of  a  Guarantee  Fund),  the  coordination of  public 
initiatives to assist  small  businesses  ("Agence 
nationale  pour  La  creation d'entreprises">,  the 
activities of  the  CIDISE  ("Comite  interministeriel 
pour  Le  developpement  des  investissements et  le 
soutien de  L'emploi"),  in  support  of  small  and 
medium-sized  businesses  with  a  high  technological 
potential or  a  high  value-added  content  and  a  greater 
role  for  the  CODEFis  ("Comites  departementaux  d'examen 
des  problemes  de  financement  'des  entreprises"). 
1976:  MEASURES  TO  ASSIST  CONSORTIA  MADE  UP  OF  SMALL 
AND  MEDIUM-SIZED  FIRMS  (Law  374/76). 
TAX  MEASURES  IN  FAVOUR  OF  SMALL  AND  MEDIUM-SIZED 
FIRMS  (1980  Budget):  in particular,  tax  r~lief  in  the 
form  of  a  carry-forward  of  losses  over  several  years 
and  a  further  increase  in  the  ceiling up  to  which 
taxable profits  are  subject  to  a  reduced  tax  rate. 
JULY  1978:  PREMIUMS  GRANTED  TO  SMALL  AND  MEDIUM-SIZED 
FIRMS  that  are  setting  up  in  business  for  the first 
time  or that  create  new  jobs  ("Loi  d'orientation 
economique">. PUBLIC  PROCUREMENT 
Germany 
France 
United 
Kingdom 
Belgium 
MEASURES  ACTING  ON  MARKETS 
1976:  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  VFW-614  AEROPLANE:  assistance 
was  intially granted  for  the  marketing  of  the 
aeroplane;  following  the difficulties experienced 
in 1974,  it was  replaced  by  direct  support  measures 
for  the  firms  involved. 
1979:  PROGRAMME  FOR  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TELEMATICS 
the  PTT  (the  postal  and  telecommunications 
administration)  embarked  on  a  major  multi-annual 
programme  for  the  introduction of  electronics  in 
the  telecommunications  field.  Development  and  supply 
contracts  serve  first  and  foremost  to  promote 
development  of  the  French  telecommunications  industry. 
GENERAL  PREFERENCE  SCHEME:  Under  th~s  scheme, 
government  and  nationalised  industries are  obliged 
to  give preference  to  firms  in  special  development 
areas  or  in development  areas  which  tender  for 
public  contracts  on  the  same  terms  as  firms  located 
in  other  areas. 
1980:  MEDIUM-TERM  PROGRAMMING  OF  PUBLIC  PROCUREMENT: 
a  role given  to  the  "Commission  d'orientation et 
de  coordination  des  commandes  pbuliques". 
Agreements  will  be  signed  between  the government 
and  ~ublic enterprises  in  the  transport  and 
communications  sectors  (the  major  guidelines  Laid· 
down  in the  1981-85  national  plan). 
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